MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND POWER POLITICS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

BY

WILLIAM F. HICKMAN

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To the twin joys of my life

Wanda and Aimee

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by

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A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

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INTRODUCTION

On March 6, 1975, the Persian Gulf states of Iran and Iraq peacefully settled a long standing dispute which had twice brought them to the brink of war. The terms of the agreement, Iraqi recognition of the Iranian right of free passage on the Shatt-al-Arab in return for the withdrawal of Iranian support for the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq,[1] removed the greatest source of tension in the northern Gulf and offered new hope for the ultimate stability of the region.[2] This settlement was quickly followed by public statements from both sides calling for the establishment of regional security structures to eliminate foreign military alliances and interference.[3] Although the settlement was peaceful, the events leading up to it were anything but. Both sides had developed extensive military capabilities and were on the verge of testing them firmly against one another when the situation was defused. It is the development of these capabilities and their effect on the politics of the Persian Gulf which is the subject of this paper.

The paper focuses on the three largest of the littoral Gulf states, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. By virtue of its early (1965) reorientation of security policy towards the Gulf, Iran has been well ahead of its neighbors in being able to define its military requirements.[4] Iran's government, in the person of the Shah, has planned since the 1960s for the assumption of Britain's role as guarantor of Gulf stability,[5] and has earnestly pursued this policy

by developing an extensive military capability. While trying to formulate Gulf-oriented security plans, Iraq has been hampered by active security threats in the form of the Kurdish rebellion and periodic war with the state of Israel, but has still been able to develop a military capability nearly as broad as that of her neighbor, Iran. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has only since 1973 placed significant emphasis on attaining a broader military capability as support for its assumption of a wider role in Gulf affairs.

The first section of the paper consists of a detailed analysis of the development of the military capabilities of the three states. It should be noted that the emphasis is on capability, i.e., the physical capacity in terms of equipment and manpower necessary for warfare, not on effective military strength. As was learned in the 1967 Six-Day War, mere possession of technologically sophisticated weapons does not ensure victory.[6] Though each of the three states possesses some of the most technologically advanced weapons available, serious doubts exist as to their ability to utilize effectively the full capabilities of the weapons. The second section of the paper will study the role of these capabilities in regional politics, while the third will analyze their role in the domestic political stability of the three states.

CHAPTER I

DEVELOPMENT OF A MILITARY CAPABILITY

Iran

During the first two decades following World War II, Iran's military posture was determined largely by the threat of attack from the Soviet Union.[7] After its experience with the Soviets in the province of Azerbaijan in 1945-46, Iran had valid reasons to regard the Soviet Union as a threat to its national security. Heartened by the decisive support of the United States in 1947, the Iranian government refused to ratify the oil concession to the Soviet-Iranian Oil Company which had been worked out as a precondition for Soviet withdrawal from Azerbaijan.[8] The resulting furor in the Soviet Union, including such statements as "Russia would consider Iran a bitter blood enemy,"[9] sharpened Iran's perception of a security threat from her northern neighbor. Although actual military aid from the United States was slow in developing because of U.S. uncertainty about Iranian domestic stability, by April 1955, when Iran joined the Baghdad pact the arms had started to flow in significant quantities.[10] During the next decade Iran enjoyed a high priority for U.S. military aid. As a member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and regarded by the U.S. as a forward defense area, Iran received substantial amounts of military equipment and training.[11] Although the U.S. didn't anticipate Iran's being a

primary Soviet invasion target, the bulk of the U.S./Iranian training activity was centered around Iranian response to a Soviet attack.[12]

Since the basic tenet of CENTO was a mutual assistance pact in which the signatory countries would come to one another's aid in the event of Soviet aggression, a larger Iranian inventory of arms was not deemed necessary. Additionally, on March 5, 1959, Iran and the United States signed a bilateral agreement in which the U.S. "promised to provide assistance, including the use of armed forces, as might be requested and mutually agreed upon, subject to the United States Constitution."[13] With these agreements in force Iran was not expected to withstand a Soviet invasion alone, merely to fight a delaying action until help could arrive.

The major items of military equipment transferred to Iran from the U.S. during this period reflect this preoccupation with the Soviet threat. Approximately 215 main battle tanks (M-47 Pattons and older Shermans), 50 M-24 Chaffee lightweight tanks, 75 F-84G subsonic jet aircraft and medium range transport aircraft were transferred to Iran from the U.S. between 1951 and 1964.[14]

Although Iran was a member of the Western alliance and had assurances of military aid from the U.S., the events of the early 1960s disillusioned Iran's leader, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis he became uneasy that Washington-made unilateral decisions might involve Iran in a conflagration against her will.[15] Likewise, he became dissatisfied with CENTO in the wake of the refusal of its members to come to the aid of Pakistan during the India-Pakistan crisis of 1965.[16] Important as these two factors were, they were overshadowed somewhat by the growing Iranian fear of Arab nationalism. The existence of a

nationalist regime in Iraq under left wing military rule had created a tense situation along Iran's western border and Egypt's Gamal Abdul Nasser was applying pressure against the Arab monarchies of the Gulf. The combination of Egyptian military activity in Yemen and a possible British withdrawal from Aden convinced the Shah that the primary threat to his country lay from the south, not the north. With these events in mind he began to pursue a more neutralist approach to foreign policy and strengthened his ties with the Soviet Union.[17]

After a significant lessening of tensions with the Soviet Union and in response to his dissatisfaction with CENTO, the Shah declared in March 1965 that henceforth Iran's military preparations would be focused on the Persian Gulf.[18] Even before the declaration, however, the Shah had given notice to the West of his altered security perspective by his 1964 request for an air defense system to protect the oil loading installations on Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf and the oil refinery at Abadan.[19] This request reflected the Iranian awareness of the vulnerability of these vital installations (some of the most sensitive of which are nearly within bazooka range of the international boundary), especially in view of the decades old border dispute with Iraq over the boundary and transit rights on the Shatt-al-Arab.[20] As a more recent stimilus, the Iraqis had received Soviet-built MIG-21 Fishbed fighters to support their TU-16 Badger bomber aircraft in 1964,[21] which provided a formidable threat to those installations. Although the American-built F-84 subsonic fighters of the Imperial Iranian Air Force could be effective against the subsonic TU-16s, they would be ineffective in combat against the supersonic MIG-21s. The request for an air defense system consisting of 91 F-5s and a number of Hawk

surface to air missile (SAM) batteries demonstrated the Iranian concern for this threat.[22] Because this was the first arms transfer to Iran which reflected the realignment of its security priorities, Table 1* (Iranian Arms Acquisition 1965-1976), begins with this transfer.

Another factor contributing to the disillusionment of the Shah was the initial American reluctance to supply the HAWKs and F-5s on the grounds that the expenditure would put a strain on the Iranian economy.[23] In an attempt to lessen his dependence on U.S. arms and to diversify his arms purchases, the Shah opened negotiations for Soviet military equipment in July 1966, completing a $110 million arms deal for "unsophisticated" equipment in February 1967.[24] Also in 1966, in a further attempt at diversification, Iran turned to Great Britain for purchase of naval equipment including one BATTLE class destroyer (ex-Royal Navy) and four SAAM class corvettes (new construction) to be fitted with Seacat SAM and Sea Killer surface to surface missiles (SSM).[25] Although these purchases can be seen as gestures of independence, it seems clear that since the Shah was holding concurrent negotiations with the U.S. for the technologically superior F-4 Phantom multi-mission aircraft, they were also designed to weaken American resistance to the sale of advanced equipment to Iran.[26] "He [the Shah] made it abundantly clear also that if the United States is unwilling or unable to meet his major military requirements he is determined to go elsewhere to acquire what he needs."[27] The September, 1966, agreement to supply 30 F-4s (Table 1) must be viewed in this context, however, this did not mean that the U.S. lost all control over

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*All tables appear in the Appendix.

Iranian arms purchases. For example, when Iran later expressed interest in the Soviet SA-2 Guideline SAM, the U.S. forced Iran to choose between the SA-2 and the F-4, stating that Iran could not have both.[28] In the midst of such flirtations with Soviet arms, the Shah added pressure on the U.S. by making a veiled threat to the effect that Iran might be forced to make bilateral agreements with her "friends and neighbors" if CENTO proved valueless.[29] The view that the Soviet agreement was completed merely in order to gain leverage in U.S. arms negotiations is given credence by the fact that there have been no subsequent Soviet arms agreements. For example, in 1970, when the Soviet Union offered to sell Iran virtually any type of military aircraft it wanted, Iran refused the offer, preferring to keep the U.S. as its primary arms supplier despite the higher prices of U.S. arms.[30]

The aggressiveness with which the Iranians pursued arms negotiations after 1965 gave good indications of their perceptions of the realities of stability in the Persian Gulf. In private conversations with Dr. Alvin J. Cottrell about this time, the Shah indicated that in his opinion, the British decision to withdraw from Aden presaged a more general departure from the Persian Gulf.[31] The 1966 contracts for five major naval vessels fitted with offensive missiles, together with the F-4 acquisitions provide concrete evidence of the Shah's intention to prepare militarily for an eventual British withdrawal from the Gulf. Following the January, 1968, British announcement of impending withdrawal, the Shah stated his policy publicly:

> We have to develop such a potential to keep this area secure after the British leave. Iran can do it because we have no territorial or colonial designs. Iran's role in the Persian

Gulf is to present the image of strength, wisdom, and absolutely altruistic purposes, and yet, without any thought of trying to play Big Daddy.[32]

In support of this policy Iran continued developing a powerful, well-balanced military capability. Since the air force had begun receiving the long range, all-weather Mach 2+ tactical F-4 Phantom aircraft[33] in 1968 and already had possession of the F-5, the Iranian air capability was well established. The naval offense rested with the acquisition of the surface to surface missile frigates, supported by two refitted U.S. Navy destroyers (Table 1). It was in the critical area of projection of troop strength beyond the borders of Iran that the Shah made the most substantial equipment acquisitions during this period. From 1967 to 1971 Iran increased the size of its helicopter fleet by ordering 140 American-designed, Italian built AB 205 and 206As, 16 French SA 321 Super Frelons and 22 American-designed, Italian-built CH-47 helicopters.[34] To support this air transport capability, Iran ordered fourteen naval hovercraft to be used for surface-borne troop transport and coastal patrol, which gave it the largest operational hovercraft fleet in the world.[35] For longer distance transport operations Iran increased its fleet of C-130 heavy-lift transport aircraft from eight in 1963 to a total of 56 on order by December 1970 (Table I).

In the years immediately following the British withdrawal, Iran continued to contract for weapon systems intended to reinforce its self-defined role of guarantor of regional stability. Although the largest purchase was the initial order of 800 Chieftain main battle tanks from Britain in 1971[36] (Table 1), more significant orders were placed. The 1972 acquisition of line of sight, wire-guided TOW anti-tank missiles[37] added a new level of battlefield

technology to the Iranian ground forces, and the 1972 contract for six Boeing 707-320 tanker aircraft (Table 1) greatly increased the range of the growing fleet of F-4 and F-5 tactical aircraft. Also in 1972, Iran contracted for six P-3 Orion ocean surveillance aircraft (Table I), which have a mission radius of over 1500 miles.[38] The reasons for the acquisition of this long-range aerial capability were allude to in a March 1971 interview with the Shah. It was the Shah's belief that an energetic foreign policy would have to encompass much of the Indian Ocean since Iran's "lifeline" passed through this area. He mentioned the need for larger naval forces "including perhaps a helicopter carrier somewhat similar to the MOSKVA class of the Soviets."[39] By 1974 Iran was acknowledged to be aiming for a patrol capability as far as 10 degrees South latitude, which is about the latitude of the American base at Diego Garcia.[40]

Although as of this writing the Shah's specific desire for a helicopter carrier has not been translated into a naval contract, he did in 1974 contract with Litton Industries of the United States for six of the new light cruiser-size SPRUANCE class destroyers.[41] For support of his growing fleet the Shah ordered three new construction fleet supply ships from West Germany in 1972 (Table 1). Each of these ships carries fuel, armament, and general stores[42] which increases both the patrol range and on station time of the destroyers and frigates of the Iranian navy. The 1975 purchase of three ex-U.S. Navy TANG class diesel submarines[43] added an entirely new dimension to Iran's expanding naval forces. Since none of the Persian Gulf states possess naval vessels large enough to warrant submarine opposition, and since the Gulf is fairly shallow, the submarines must be intended for protection of the sea lanes in the

Indian Ocean. In 1975 Iranian military officers verified this contention by describing Iran's intention to patrol the northern reaches of the Indian Ocean.[44]

After 1972, the technical complexity of the Iranian arsenal increased dramatically as a result of two unrelated circumstances. In a May 1972, state visit to Iran, then-President Nixon, in consultation with his national security adviser Henry Kissinger, informed the Shah that the U.S. would sell to Iran any conventional weapon system that Iran wanted to procure, including either the F-14 or F-15 advanced air superiority jet fighter aircraft.[45] When Iran began receiving increased revenue from the jump in oil prices in late 1973, the Shah had both the financial resources and official U.S. permission for access to the most advanced U.S. military technology. Some of the results of this combination of factors can be seen in Table 1. In 1974 alone, Iran signed contracts with the United States for the following: 80 F-14A Tomcat Mach 2+ interceptor aircraft, which is a significant technological advance over both the F-4 and "the latest Soviet combat aircraft";[46] 222 RGM Harpoon SSM, to be fitted onto the Iranian hovercraft[47] and which can be fired from the P-3 Orion aircraft;[48] laser-guided bombs; six SPRUANCE class destroyers; six batteries of HAWK improved SAM; 424 Phoenix air to air missiles, for use on the F-14 and which have a proven range of at least 68 nautical miles;[49] 634 shoulder-fired Dragon anti-tank missiles; 2850 Maverick television-guided air to surface missiles; more TOW anti-tank missiles, bringing the total inventory to 6700 missiles; 36 F-4E fighter bomber aircraft; and six KC-135 tanker aircraft (Table 1). These quantum leaps in technology were continued in 1975 with the acquisition of three submarines, 1200 Chieftain main battle tanks, advanced F-5F tactical fighter bomber

aircraft and intelligence collection systems. In 1976 this pattern continued with the addition of RH-53D minesweeping helicopters, F-15 advanced air superiority fighter aircraft, F-16 lightweight fighter aircraft, and the Standard SAM to be fitted onto Iran's DD-710 class destroyers (Table 1). Iran is being provided with a varied and potent offensive capability, one which can respond to numerous kinds of threats.

Although Iran is in the process of taking delivery on these systems,[50] serious doubts exist as to whether or not the Iranians are capable of fully utilizing the technology their government has purchased. Like the other Gulf states, Iran has historically been a non-industrial nation and despite serious attempts at rapid modernization in recent years, it possesses no widebased technological sophistication among its general population. For example, in order to provide proper maintenance for the advance technology systems such as the F-14, a fledgling mechanical pool might be taught basic repair functions before it can be trained to handle the much more complicated and exacting requirements of state-of-the art avionics. As one interested observer of Gulf affairs put it, their basis for technological receptability is quite low simply because "they didn't tinker with machinery as children."[51] A senior U.S. naval aviator agreed with that assessment by saying that their lack of technological familiarity in the formative years can be viewed as one reason for the difficulty experienced by many foreign aviation students in U.S. Navy training programs in adjusting to the high level of co-ordinated relative motion awareness and technical expertise required for flight.[52]

Another major problem for Iran and the other Gulf states is the lack of an industrial infrastructure. Because of this problem, if no spare parts are available in the country, the

non-functioning system must be shipped back to the factory for repairs. The government of Iran is aware of this limitation and is attempting to develop the necessary industrial infrastructure through such means as a $255 million contract with Bell Helicopter Company to train 1500 helicopter pilots and 5000 mechanics in Iran, while developing a complete maintenance and logistics support system for the aviation branch of the Iranian army,[53] a $25 million contract with Hughes Aircraft to build an electro-optics plant in Shiraz, where they hope to develop an electronics industry with exportable technology,[54] a contract with Grumman Corporation for training and support of the F-14 in Esfahan,[55] and the pending contract with West Germany for assembly of the Leopard main battle tank.[56] The U.S. government, in support of this concerted Iranian effort to build up a viable technological base, has approved coproduction agreements for helicopters, anti-tank and air to surface missiles which will be assembled in Iran.[57] Finally, in an attempt to improve the vitally important logistics support capability of the armed forces, Iran has recently signed a contract with Lockheed Air Services for the organization of a supply and logistics tracking system called Peace Log.[58] Through efforts such as these, Iran's military is trying to rapidly overcome its non-technological handicap. It is recognized, however, that without substantial support from foreign technicians, the Iranians have little hope of maintaining their armed forces for "at least a decade or more.[59] It has been reported to Congress that due to heavy Iranian dependence on U.S. technological assistance, it is unlikely that Iran could go to war in the next five to ten years without U.S. support on a "day-to-day basis."[60]

Although Iran has vastly expanded its conventional military capability during the last decade, it has yet to acquire a nuclear military capability. Unlike Iraq, it has not acquired nuclear capable missiles (see Iraqi discussion below), however, it is quickly entering into the field of nuclear technology. In May 1976 Iran purchased two nuclear reactors from France as the initial acquisitions in an ambitious nuclear power program. When the Iranian prime minister was asked if the order included construction of a fuels processing plant, which is critical to any nuclear weapons program, he replied that the agreement covered "the whole gamut of nuclear technologies." It was reported, however, that the value of the contract, $1.2 billion, was not considered sufficient to cover the cost of a reprocessing plant.[61] Iran quickly followed up this purchase with a West German deal for two 1200 megawatt nuclear power plants at a total cost of $4.4 billion, which included a ten year supply of nuclear fuel. At the time of the contract, Akbar Etemad, the Iranian atomic energy president, said his country did not yet need a nuclear fuel reprocessing capability.[62] Whether or not Iran will need or want it in the future is, as yet, undetermined. It is due partly to this question that negotiations with the U.S. government have stalled over the Iranian purchase of up to nine additional nuclear reactors.[63] The speed and energy with which Iran is pursuing its nuclear program is raising questions regarding its ultimate intentions. Given the potential instability of the region, the continuing Irano-Iraqi arms race, and the Shah's expressed intention to act as guarantor of peace and stability for the other Gulf states, it is very likely that the Iranian decision to acquire nuclear weapons may not be too far in the future, if, indeed, it has not already been made.

It has been reported that because of the priority assigned to the "prestige" purchases, such as the F-14, already-trained personnel have been transferred to these new systems with a resultant degradation of overall military effectiveness.[64] This is significant because rather that having one completely operational system (F-4 or F-5) while personnel are undergoing training on the new system, Iran is faced with the problem of having all the systems involved operating at a reduced capability while the personnel learn their new jobs.

Iraq

Prior to the July 1958 overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy, the country's military ties were close enough to the Western powers for its armed forces to be considered little more than appendages of the British military stationed in the area.[65] The prevailing anti-Soviet orientation of the West in this period attracted monarchial Iraq because that country, like Iran, had experienced problems with its northern neighbor. In 1946 the Soviet Union provided sanctuary for rebellious Iraqi Kurds, who remained under Soviet protection within its borders for the next thirteen years. Following this episode, Iraq adopted a severe anti-Communist stance in both her internal and external policies. Within Iraq the monarchy carried out an effective purge of the Communist party between 1947 and 1949 which decimated the membership and paralyzed its leadership.[66] Even though Iraq had adopted such a hard-line stance towards the Communists, as late as 1953 its government still experienced difficulty in obtaining all the military aid it desired from Great Britain.

As an inducement for Iraq to join in a regional defense system, the United States signed a military assistance agreement in April 1954.[67] In January of the following year Iraq severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the following month joined with Turkey in the Baghdad Pact.[68] They were joined later in the year by Iran, Pakistan, and Great Britain.

Although the military assistance pact had been signed with the United States, from 1955 to 1958 Iraq received the majority of her military support from Great Britain. In this period the U.S. provided five subsonic F-86 Sabre jet fighters and 40 M-24 light tanks, but Britain handed over approximately 90 Centurion main battle/tanks, 30 fighter and fighter bomber aircraft (Hawker-Hunter MK 6s and DeHaviland Venoms) plus three transport aircraft.[69]

Following the 1958 revolution, Iraq's military orientation was abruptly shifted from an anti-Soviet posture to a generally pro-Soviet one. Although the official Iraqi policy was one of non-alignment it quickly established friendly relations with much of the Communist world, withdrawing from the Baghdad Pact in March 1959. The Soviet Union capitalized on the Western reluctance to continue supplying arms and training and negotiated and arms-trade agreement which solidly established Iraq as a Soviet weapons client.[70] It is interesting to note that this first substantial arms agreement altered the existing balance of military power between Iraq and her former treaty ally, Iran, and played a major role in the outbreak of the Shatt-al-Arab crisis in 1959. The arms supplied, about 45 subsonic jet fighters, trainers and transport aircraft, 125 T-54 and older T-34 main battle tanks, and two 50 ton P-6 class motor torpedo boats,[71] began to give Iraq a military capability which was superior to Iran's. This pact also established Soviet military

training and assistance teams in Baghdad and provided for the training of Iraqi military cadets in the Soviet Union.

In the following years as Iraq has attempted to maintain its neutralist approach to foreign policy, it has concluded a number of arms agreements with both the United Kingdom and France, but for the most part, the country has remained a Soviet arms client. In 1960 the revolutionary government stepped back slightly from its close alignment with the Soviet Union and concluded an agreement with the British for a few DH Vampire training aircraft. The same year, however, the Soviet Union provided Iraq with more advanced MIG 17D and MIG 19 fighter aircraft, four more P-6 torpedo boats, 29 T-54 tanks, about 25 JS III main battle tanks and some BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers (totaling 200 by 1962).[72] The level of Soviet arms aid in relation to that of Great Britain clearly indicates the continuing domination of Soviet assistance.

A major factor affecting the Iraqi requests for arms was the beginning of the Kurdish rebellion in Northern Iraq. Although the Soviet Union generally supported the aims of the Kurdish rebellion because of its possible weakening effect on the CENTO alliance,[73] it continued its strong military support of the Iraqi central government. The Soviet transfers of MI-1 and AN-12 military helicopters which occurred during the same period[74] can be viewed as responses to an Iraqi requirement to be able to accurately deploy forces against Kurdish strongholds. The 1962 delivery of TU-16 Badger jet bomber aircraft was the first quantum improvement in Iraqi military capability. The aircraft could deliver 19,800 pounds of bombs against the Kurds, but its 3900 mile range[75] also enabled it to reach any point in the Persian Gulf area. Because of this

significant ability it is with this transfer that Table 2 (Iraqi Arms Acquisitions/Contracts 1962-76) begins.

The February 1963 Ba'athist coup precipitated a temporary halt in Soviet military aid to Iraq. As the new government carried out a purge of Iraqi communists, the Soviets withdrew their advisors and suspended their agreements, creating a lack of spare parts for the Soviet-made weapons and shortages of ammunition which in turn caused a slow-down in the prosecution of the war against the Kurds.[76] To remedy the situation Iraq turned to Britain and began negotiations which culminated in agreements (between 1964 and 1966) for 59 Hawker-Hunter fighter, fighter/ground attack, and trainer aircraft, about 100 Saracen APCs and 20 Jet Provost aircraft.[77] Additionally, agreements were reached on the supply of artillery ammunition and the training of air force cadets who were withdrawn from the Soviet Union and sent to Britain.[78] The weapons which were obtained from Britain during this period, as with the TU-16 transfer, were weapons which could be used both against the Kurds and in a Persian Gulf role. For example, the Jet Provost aircraft are light strike aircraft[79] which in a ground support role should be effective against the exposed oil facilities at Abadan.

When the Ba'athists were removed from power by another military coup late in 1963, relations with the Soviet Union thawed somewhat and Iraq reopened arms negotiations with the Soviets in 1964. The agreement reached in June 1964[80] is significant in several respects. First it provided the needed spare parts for the Soviet equipment idled by the previous withdrawal of Soviet support. Second, in addition to the supply of more heavy and light tanks, automatic weapons, and ammunition, it provided for the establishment of five arms and ammunition factories in Iraq. These factories

could provide a degree of autonomy in and shorten the time required for future rearming and ammunition resupply efforts for the Iraqi military. The most significant aspect of the agreement, however, was the 1964 transfer of 12 MIG-21 supersonic, short-range fighter aircraft to Iraq. The transfer of these aircraft provided weight for the subsequent Iranian request for F-5 fighters and HAWK SAM and can be regarded as one of the initial steps in the burgeoning Iraqi/Iranian arms race.

The MIG-21 at that time was a front-line Soviet jet fighter. Although its short combat radius of 348 miles placed some limitations on its usefulness as a Persian Gulf weapon, its Mach 1.5 speed and air to air combat capabilities were decidedly superior to the second rate F-84s of the Iranian air force.[81] The aircraft's short range would not be a handicap if the target was the Abadan oil complex, a fact apparently well appreciated by the Iranians. The supply of the MIG-21s also for the first time gave Iraq an effective escort aircraft for its TU-16 bombers on short missions. In this regard it must be noted that Iraq did not receive and currently does not possess an indigenous aerial refueling capability.[82] This fact continually limits the Iraqi MIG-21 fleet to short range combat operations.

These Soviet arms transfers should not only be viewed vis a vis the Iranians, however. Since the formation of the state of Israel, Iraq has expressed strong anti-Zionist sentiments and has supported the Arab efforts against that state.[83] The degree to which another conflict with Israel was considered in the 1964 arms agreement is open to speculation, but it can be reasoned that it played at least some part in the motivation for the extensive arms contract. Between the signing of the agreement and the outbreak of

the Six Day War in 1967, Iraq received shipment of a total of 60 MIG-21s, placing the size of its air force second only to Egypt in the Arab world.[84] Although Iraq did not participate very heavily in the war it loaned some of its aircraft to Jordan and lost a total of 28 aircraft to Israeli action.[85]

One of the results of the war was an intensification of the contacts with the Soviet Union. Less than a month after the Israeli victory the President of the Soviet Union visited Baghdad to reaffirm these contacts and to promise more Soviet aid and arms.[86] The transfer of 2 TU-16s, 10 MIG-21s, 20 SU-7s, and 12 MIG-17/19s can be viewed as the tangible expression of this Soviet verbal support (Table II).[87] Despite this, another result was the Iraqi desire for more diversification of their sources for military equipment which can be seen by the Iraqi military shopping expeditions to Paris in late 1967 and early 1968. These expeditions resulted in the announcement of pending agreements for 70 French AMX-30 main battle tanks and 52 Mirage V fighter aircraft.[88] Although these negotiations were suspended after the successive coups during July 1968, a deal was consumated for 70 AML-90 armoured cars and 12 Alouette III helicopters which, in the military version, were designed to be weapons carrying attack helicopters.[89]

Of the three factors mentioned above affecting the Iraqi demand for weapons during the 1960s, i.e., the prosecution of the Kurdish War, the anti-Israeli struggles and the anti-Iranian/Persian Gulf interest, the Kurdish factor had the greatest import. Despite periodic truces with the rebels, the central government had waged more or less continuous war against them throughout the decade. This became a point of increasing irritation to the Soviet Union and Iran both of which supported the Kurds. As the decade came to a

close, though, the dispute between Iraq and Iran began to assume greater significance. The resurgence of the Shatt-al-Arab controversy in 1969 and the realization that because of the Kurdish problem it could not assist the Arabs in a war with Israel forced Iraq to stabilize its domestic political situation in order to be able to present a more concentrated effort towards its foreign policy.[90] The March 1970 peace settlement with the Kurds allowed the government of Iraq to shift its primary focus to the external problems it faced. The arms acquisitions which followed indicate a large expansion of the capabilities of the Iraqi army. Between 1969 and 1971 Iraq received 500 T-54 and newer T-55 main battle tanks and 45 PT-76 light tanks (Table 2) while expanding its army from 70,000 men with one armoured division to 85,000 men with four armoured divisions.[91] The Iraqis also increased the mobility of their army by the acquisition of 27 MI-4 and MI-8 military helicopters.

The close military ties Iraq had with the Soviet Union were dramatically strengthened by the April 1972 signing of a fifteen year treaty of friendship and cooperation between Iraq and the Soviet Union.[92] The military aid Iraq received following the signing of this agreement was substantial: 130 T-34, T-54 and T-55 main battle tanks, 300 BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers, 400 artillery pieces and anti-aircraft guns, 20 MIG-21s, 12 SU-7s, SA-3 GOA SAM, and, most significantly, 3 OSA class Fast Patrol Boats (FPB) armed with STYX surface to surface missiles (Table 2). The introduction of the OSA FPBs into the Iraqi navy was the first attempt to counter the growing Iranian naval capability. In January 1972 a party of Swiss and American journalists had reported the Iranian navy to be the Persian Gulf's most efficient and powerful local naval force.[93]

The Iraqi recognition of their inability to oppose the Iranians at sea can be viewed as the primary reason for the acquisition of the 26 nautical mile STYX missile, the effectiveness of which had been proven in 1967 by the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by Eqyptian forces.[94]

Significant as these transfers were in diversifying the Iraqi military capability, it was not until after the 1973 war with Israel that the military technology being acquired by Iraq experienced qualitative advancements similar to those which Iran had been experiencing during the previous few years. The beginning of this process was the introduction of TU-22 Blinder supersonic bombers in October 1973 (Table 2). Although these aircraft have a shorter range than the older TU-16s (1400 miles to 3900 miles), their speed (800 knots to 510 knots) provides a significant increase in combat capability.[95] The Soviet Union reportedly maintained tight control over these aircraft by providing Soviet pilots,[96] but Iraqis were seen in the Soviet Union learning how to fly and maintain them.[97] As the war against the Kurds flared up again during 1973 and 1974 and tensions with Iran mounted over the conflict,[98] Iraq requested and the Soviet Union supplied other technologically advanced weapons. In addition to the TU-22 and a resupply of the SA-3 GOA SAM, Iraq acquired SA-6 SAM, SA-7 SAM, MIG-23 fighter bomber aircraft and the FROG surface to surface missile (Table 2). The new acquisitions provided a mix of mobile high altitude (SA-6) and low altitude (SA-3) missiles supplemented by highly mobile shoulder fired short range SA-7s and was a Soviet attempt to provide an integrated air defense capability similar to the one which had proven so effective for the Egyptians in the Yom Kippur War.[99] The most immediately significant weapon placed at Iraq's disposal was undoubtedly the

MIG-23 aircraft. These variable geometry wing, Mach 2.8 fighters were operated by the Soviets, who, as in the case of the TU-22s, provided both pilots and maintenance personnel, though in this case there were no reports of Iraqis in training for operation or maintenance of the aircraft.[100] The acquisition of such a highly sophisticated airplane must be viewed as a response to the pending Iranian purchase of the F-14. From a different perspective, however, the most significant Iraqi purchase was the long range (4 to 50 nautical mile)[101] FROG SSM. This weapon was supplemented in February 1975 by the 70 nautical mile range SCUD SSM, which are reportedly being operated by Soviet technicians.[102] Although the older unguided, spin-stabilized FROGs and the more accurate SCUD guided missiles are reported to be armed with conventional warheads,[103] Jane's All The World's Aircraft lists both weapons as capable of carrying nuclear warheads.[104] Though the weapons are formidable with conventional high explosive warheads, the fact that they are nuclear capable makes them potentially devastating and ushers in the first nuclear-associated weapon technology to the Persian Gulf states.

Since 1968 Iraq has been operating a small atomic reactor provided by the Soviet Union in Baghdad[105] and in September 1975, announced a nuclear cooperation agreement with France. This agreement, which came after Iraqi Vice-President Saddam Hussain had viewed the Phoenix fast-breeder experimental reactor, reportedly includes terms for the purchase of a French nuclear reactor and several light water units.[106] There were no reports of a nuclear fuels reprocessing plant, however. Even though Iraq does not currently possess the capability to produce nuclear weapons, its expanding

nuclear energy program plus its possession of nuclear capable missiles raises the question of its ultimate intention.

Despite beliefs in late 1975 and early 1976 that the Iraqi-Irano rapproachement might be an attempt by Iraq to place some distance between itself and the Soviet Union, there are published reports that a significant and comprehensive military assistance treaty was signed between Iraq and the Soviet Union in August 1976.[107] The Iranian newspaper Kayhan International reported that a $3 billion agreement had been signed which included the technologically sophisticated weapons listed in Table 2. Partial substantiation of the arms deal has been received from a November 5, 1976, Associated Press story quoting the Arab weekly magazine Events. This report put the amount of the arms deal at $4 billion, and it reportedly included the following: 138 MIG-23s, a squadron of MIG-25s, several batteries of SCUD/Scalebird SSM, several hundred T-62 and T-64 tanks, seven naval frigates, six submarines, numerous missile carrying gunboats, APCs and artillery.[108] Although the overall cost, some of the weapons and the quantities differ, it can be concluded from these reports that some sort of a substantial arms contract has been signed; one which both qualitatively and quantitively increases the capabilities of each component of the Iraqi armed forces. It only a portion of the weapons mentioned are actually to be transferred, it indicates a major closening of Iraqi ties with the Soviet Union. Both sources indicate that the number of Soviet technicians and advisers will increase substantially in order to help the Iraqi military absorb these new weapons. The introduction of the MIG-25 to a Persian Gulf country, whether in a combat role or a reconnaisance role, must be viewed as a response to the Iranian F-14s which are now being delivered, just as the MIG-23s

were to the earlier order of the same airplane. As in the case of its earlier deployment to Egypt, the MIG-25 will be tightly controlled and flown by Soviet pilots.[109] At the very least, this agreement can be viewed as evidence of the continuation of the Iraqi/Irano arms race.

The most significant portions of the agreement, as reported by the Iranian press (if true), do not relate to military hardware. Reportedly, the Soviet Union has gained territorial control of the largest Iraqi air force base at Shaibe, creating an enclave which is sealed off from even the Iraqis. In return for the territoriality the Iraqis are supposedly to receive covert Soviet support for any proposed actions Iraq may choose to carry out against Persian Gulf states.[110] Since this portion of the agreement is reported only in the Iranian press it is, of course, suspect. It is also questionable whether the Iraqi government, which is very nationalistic, would go quite as far as to allow Soviet territoriality.

Although little information is available on the subject, it can be reasonably assumed that the general lack of widespread technological sophistication in Iraqi society provides the military with a set of problems similar to those experienced by the Iranian military. They possess sophisticated weapons of vast capability, but without direct Soviet support, their ability to fully utilize those capabilities is, at best, doubtful. As in the case of Iran, the lack of technological familiarity and the absence of an industrial base severely limits the Iraqis ability to absorb the new technology.

Saudi Arabia

The development of a Saudi Arabian military capability has been influenced by two major factors: (1) that country's close ties with the United States and Great Britain; and (2) the reign of King Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz. Up to 1953 Saudi Arabia was strongly ruled by Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman, known as Ibn Saud.[111] Because of the British hegemony in the Persian Gulf and the close economic ties with the United States due to the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO), Ibn Saud's military ties were with these two states. From 1947 to 1950 Britain began a modernization of the Saudi armed forces and provided officer training at Sandhurst, the British Military Academy.[112] In June 1951 when Ibn Saud signed a mutual assistance pact with the U.S., providing that country with basing rights for its Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers, the major responsibility for training the Saudi forces passed to it.[113] The equipment (small amounts of World War II vintage armoured cars and airplanes)[114] and training that was provided to the Saudis by both the U.S. and Great Britain as a result of these arrangements was in keeping with the prevailing large power practice of defining a smaller state's defense requirements in terms of East-West tensions and creating small indigenous forces which would be dependent upon the outside powers for real military security. The regular Saudi army and air force created by the U.S. fit this model.[115]

During the reign of Ibn Saud's successor, Saud ibn Abdul Aziz al-Saud, the military development stagnated. The situation was complicated by the suspension of diplomatic relations with Great Britain in 1956 over the Suez Crisis and the establishment of closer ties with Nasser's Egypt. In a show of support for the Arab cause

Saudi Arabia joined in a tri-partite pact with Egypt and Syria and invited an Egyptian mission to help train its military forces.[116] During this period of competition with Egypt in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. began supplying the Saudis with small numbers of more advanced weaponry: 10 F-86F jet fighters in 1957, 15 M-24 Chaffee light tanks in 1958-59, 10 M-47 Patton main battle tanks in 1960-61, and 11 more F-86F jets in 1962.[117]

By 1963 Saudi Arabia had begin to re-evaluate its security requirements in light of Egyptian participation in the Yemeni Civil War. By providing 12,000 troops to fight in the rebellion in 1962,[118] Nasser compelled the Saudi government to realize that it had no viable defense force which could control a Yemeni-type insurrection. The wholehearted military support of the U.S. in such an event was open to question because of the U.S. recognition of the Yemeni rebels and the subsequent termination of the SAC basing agreement in 1962.[119] It was as a result of this period of uncertainty that Saudi Arabia began to formulate military requirements based on its own perception of need rather than using imposed perceptions. The re-establishment of relations with Great Britain in 1963 and the assumption of the throne by King Faisal the following year set the stage for a serious attempt to develop a modern, albeit small, Saudi military capability.

The first weapons acquisition which took place under both the altered Saudi security perception and the leadership of King Faisal was an air defense system for protection of the Saudi supply lines to the Yemeni Royalists. Originally requested in 1963, the system was to consist of advanced fighter aircraft and a surface to air missile system. The Saudis clearly indicated their new attitude by taking two years to evaluate four possible aircraft; the

American F-5 and F-104, the British Lightning and the French Mirage III.[120] The December, 1965, decision produced a joint British/American package deal. From the British, Saudi Arabia purchased 40 Lightning Mach 2+ interceptors, 25 Jet Provost light strike aircraft and an advanced radar system. From the U.S. it obtained a HAWK missile system (Table 3).

The acquisition of these weapons was only the first step in a decade-long modernization of the Saudi military. In 1966 the Saudi government requested accelerated delivery of the American HAWKs to deter attacks by Egyptian forces of the Saudi supply lines to the Royalist Yemenis. When the U.S. refused, an emergency program, Operation Magic Carpet, was begun by the British. The equipment transferred, six Hunters, five Lightnings and 37 thunderbird SAM (Table 3), were refurbished British arms. The significance of Operation Magic Carpet lies in the fact that because Saudi Arabia as yet had no trained pilots for the procured aircraft, British mercenary pilots flew combat patrols for the Saudis when the aircraft were deployed along the Yemeni border.[121] The reason this is considered significant is because in recent history Saudi Arabia is the only nation of the three major Gulf states which has been forced to resort to hiring foreign mercenaries for combat operations. The Soviets provided Iraq with pilots for its advanced aircraft, but this was in order to retain tight control over the weapons. Evidence that they have flown the aircraft in combat operations for the Iraqis is lacking. The Americans have provided technical assistance for their weapon systems but have stopped short of operating them for the Persian Gulf clients. Also in 1966 the Saudis began a significant modernization program for the ordnance corps of their army, purchasing some 4200 tactical and general purpose vehicles and,

most significantly, a modern logistics system (Table 3). This presented a very early indication of King Faisal's awareness of the logistical problems associated with maintaining a modern armed force and his intention of dealing seriously with the problem.

The close economic ties existing between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia plus that government's staunch opposition to communism have contributed to a strongly pro-Western Saudi foreign policy.[122] Despite this policy, however, relations between the two countries have been periodically strained because of the firm Saudi support of the Arab cause and the U.S. support for Israel. In one such period following the June War, Saudi Arabia expanded its arms suppliers to include France and Italy. From France it purchased some 200 AML-90 Panhard armoured cars in spring 1968, followed by six Alouette III weapons carrying helicopters the following year (Table 3). Following the helicopter purchase it was announced that Saudis would begin to receive training in the French arms industry,[123] another indication of their desire to place some distance between their government and that of the U.S. With Italy the Saudis contracted for 24 AB205 and 206 helicopter (Table 3). Despite the strained relations during this period, the U.S. supplied some older M-41 Walker Bulldog tanks and several medium lift transport aircraft (C-118s, C-123s, and C-140s) as shown in Table 3.

In relation to the military forces of the other major states of the Persian Gulf, the armed forces of Saudi Arabia have always been fairly small. Unlike Iran, Saudi Arabia made no public policy of expanding its military as a hedge against an eventual British withdrawal from the Gulf. However, the expansion of their air force roughly coincided with the shift of Iranian defense orientation to the Persian Gulf. When the Lightning aircraft contract began in

early 1966 the Saudi air force numbered a mere 600 men.[124] One year later ISS reported the strength of the air force to be 5000 men,[125] which was confirmed by Sellars in 1968.[126] Although it is possible that an awareness of an eventual British departure played a part in the expansion of the air force, the size of the expansion and the fact that a like expansion did not take place in the other Saudi armed forces tends to discount this possibility. Although the army received light tanks and armoured cars during the following two years, the size of the force did not change. It remained steady at 30,000 men, organized in five infantry brigades with light armoured support, well past the beginning of the current decade.[127] After the British announcement, the Saudis modestly expanded their minuscule naval force by the acquisition of a few coastal patrol boats and hovercraft from Great Britain (Table 1). By not acquiring offensive naval vessels the Saudis were tacitly acceding, at least temporarily, to a Persian-imposed stability in the Gulf as a replacement for that which had been supplied by the departing British. The 1969 contract for three Jaguar fast attack torpedo boats with West Germany again expanded the naval capability only slightly (Table 3) during a period when the littoral states were all seeking workable post-British Persian Gulf policies. The only major weapon acquisition which occurred between the time of the British announcement and the withdrawal was the October 1971 contract for 50 F-5A/B interceptor and fighter/bomber aircraft (Table 3). These airplanes, in conjunction with the Lightnings, would provide a more varied air defense capability. Because of the timing of the contract, this acquisition can be viewed as a response to the British withdrawal.

The Iranian seizure of Abu Musa and the two Tumbs in November 1971, provided a new background for the development of the Saudi military capability. Although its public reaction was mild,[128] Saudi Arabia contracted for a major expansion of its naval forces only three months after the seizure. The Saudi Naval Expansion Program contract agreed to provide thirteen small surface to surface missile equipped ships, a minesweeping force, assorted smaller craft, new shore installations and extensive training (Table 3). A contract of this magnitude cannot be regarded merely as a spur of the moment response to the Iranian seizure, however. Since a precedent had been set in 1965 by the two year evaluation of the U.S./Great Britain air defense proposals, it is very likely a similar extensive evaluation took place in this case. Despite this, to disregard the Iranian action and its probable effect on the Saudi motivation for naval expansion would be foolish. Taken together, it appears that while the Saudis were not loudly condemning the Iranians they were making significant preparations for an eventual assumption of a greater role in the Gulf affairs.

In operating and maintaining a modern military capability Saudi Arabia faces the same problems created by the lack of a technological/industrial base as do the other Gulf states. Like Iran, the country is attempting to overcome this serious deficiency, but whereas Iran is utilizing military equipment joint production contracts to spur the technological advance, Saudi Arabia is placing more importance on the civilian sector.[129] The Saudis do have at least one contract similar to the Iranian model; a $1.14 billion contract with Raytheon for improved HAWK SAM with half the work being done in Saudi Arabia.[130] An additional problem the Saudis face that Iran and Iraq do not, is the small size of the Saudi

population and an accompanying critical shortage of skilled manpower, which places severe limitations on its capacity for significantly expanding its military capability.[131] Since these problems and limitations dictate a Saudi dependence on foreign technical assistance which, in all probability will last longer than a similar Iranian dependence, they must be considered during discussion of the dramatic weapons purchases which occurred after 1972.

From 1973 to the present, Saudi Arabia, like Iran, has been using its increased oil revenues to greatly expand its military capability (Table 3). The reasons behind this expansion include: the availability of funds to purchase the desired arms, the Saudi desire to develop its own military to help prevent big power involvement in the Persian Gulf,[132] the increasing Saudi role as an arms supplier to the front-line Arab states,[133] the possibility of war with Iraq and the above mentioned response to the expansion of the Iranian military.[134] Although the level of sophistication of the newer Saudi weapons is generally similar to that possessed by Iraq and Iran (see Tables 1, 2, and 3), it must be pointed out that the overall Saudi capability nowhere near approaches that of Iran. Even though the Saudis started purchasing modern weapons in 1966, it has only been in the last few years that they, with the help of foreign advisors, have formulated specific force and mission requirements beyond those existing in the 1950s and early 1960s. In addition to the naval expansion program, in 1973 the U.S. developed a modernization program for the National Guard which would give it a reasonable ability to respond to terrorist and guerrilla activities. One of the lesser known reasons associated with the granting of this contract was the Saudi concern about two large fires which took place at the ARAMCO refinery at Ras Tanura in 1973. They were caused

by sabotage presumed to have been carried out by the Palestinian guerrillas.[135]

In late 1974 the Pentagon, at the request of the Saudi Arabians, completed a survey of the Saudi military needs up to 1984. The U.S. recommendations to the Saudi government included the creation of (1) four mechanized brigades, each with three mechanized battalions; (2) a tank battalion and other combat and support elements; (3) an airborne brigade with three airborne infantry battalions; (5) one attack helicopter battalion; and (6) two air cavalry battalions with two assault support helicopter companies.[136] These recommendations, when enacted, will provide Saudi Arabia with the ability to significantly project its military power beyond its own borders and will constitute another quentum leap in military capability. The fact that the Saudis requested such a broad survey to be made by a foreign power is indicative of the state of their planning ability. Although they possess the means to purchase a modern armed force, they lack the ability to design their own. The real question is whether or not the Saudis have enough personnel to man the new units. In the past the Saudis hired mercenary pilots to fly combat missions against the Yemenis. Given the very real manpower problem described above they may have to resort to the use of mercenaries again in order to effectively utilize the new weapons in the near future.

C H A P T E R I I

MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND POWER POLITICS

Throughout history military capabilities have played a major role in power politics. The degree to which a state achieves its political objectives can, in many instances, be attributed to its desire and ability to militarily support its political decisions. This thesis has been lent support by the actions of the major Persian Gulf States in recent years. Before delving deeply into this aspect of Gulf politics, a few words regarding the overall political objectives of the three Gulf states would be in order.

Since turning its attention to the Gulf in 1965, the Iranian government has had two main objectives in its Gulf policy: first, that the oil installations and the passage of oil out of the Gulf be protected from disruption and second, that the governments of the region be protected against subversion, be it internal or external.[137] Saudi Arabian Gulf objectives, although less energetic than those of its Persian neighbor, are also fairly well defined. They revolve around a strong defense of Islam, Koranic traditions and teachings, and secondly, a staunch opposition to regional communism and related non-traditional ideologies.[138] Despite the differences which have existed between Saudi Arabia and Iran they find common ground in their opposition to the anti-monarchial ideology expressed by the third large Gulf state, Iraq. As the only non-traditional government among the littoral states of the Gulf, Iraq holds a

revolutionary view of regional politics. Diametrically opposed to Iranian hegemony in the Gulf, it also favors extensive internal political reform in its neighboring countries.[139] In pursuit of these objectives over the last seventeen years each of the three major Gulf states has utilized its military capability to one degree or another. It is interesting to note that the success or failure of the political objectives in this period has not rested entirely upon the overt use of a superior military capability by one state, but more often has hinged upon the strength of the resolve in a government to use what military capability is available.

The clearest example of a military capability playing a pivotal role in Persian Gulf politics is seen in the series of crises which occurred between Iran and Iraq over the Shatt-al-Arab. As discussed earlier, the dispute between the two states regarding the use of the waterway had been of long standing, traceable in modern times to the Frontier Treaty, signed in 1937. Although the treaty placed the boundary demarcation along the thalweg line in the immediate vicinity of Abadan and called for an eventual sharing by Iran in the administrative duties, dredging and pilotage of the waterway,[140] in reality, the problems had not been resolved. Over the years, Iran retained complete control of those services, in effect making Iranian use of the waterway reliant upon Iraqi good will.[141] After the Iraqi government interferred with the passage of Iranian ships in 1959, the Shah began to reassert his country's demand for settlement of the dispute. In reaction to the Shah's agitation, Iraq declared that portion of the 1937 treaty establishing thalweg demarcation to be null and void, thereby claiming the entire waterway.[142] This action caused both sides to initiate military preparations such as altering their armed forces and fortifying

their borders, but no open military action resulted. The Shah had doubts about his country's military capability and avoided the pending military confrontation.[143] As pointed out in the earlier discussion of Iraq's military development, the first Soviet arms transfer to Iraq had tipped the balance of Gulf military power in Iraq's favor. It was enough of a military edge that it prevented the Shah from opting for military action in this case. Iraq, on the other hand, had the military capability to press its claim, but it chose not to do so. One possible reason for the Iraqi reluctance was the domestic political instability of the time. General Abd al-Karim Qassem, the military ruler, had survived an assasination attempt in October 1959 and the trials of those accused were going on during the Shatt-al-Arab crisis.[144] Because of this mutual reluctance to use force, the status of the waterway remained unchanged after the situation calmed down. Iran retained control of the waters near Abadan and Iraq still administered the river services.[145]

The 1959 balance of power between Iran and Iraq existed for much of the next decade, precluding any significant change in the respective positions on the Shatt-al-Arab question. Although inflammatory rhetoric periodically flowed from both sides, it was not until Iran had gained a clear military advantage that a break in the stalemate occurred. On April 15, 1969, Iraq reasserted its claim to the entire Shatt-al-Arab, demanding that ships flying the Iranian flag lower it before entering the estuary and that no Iranian naval personnel be aboard. In the earlier confrontation Iraq's threat of force had been implied by the massing of troops. However, in this instance the Iraqi deputy foreign minister publicly warned that military action would be taken if the demands were not met.[146] In 1959-60 Iraq could have carried out such a threat with a fair chance

of success; however, in 1969 when the threat was made, Iraq was in a poor position to try to back it up. Although Iraq had more combat aircraft, 213 to 180, Iran was receiving its F-4D Phantom jets which were technologically superior to the MIG-21 mainstay of Iraq's air force.[147] Also, for any ground action which might result from the controversy, Iraq would have been at a distinct numerical disadvantage. At the time Iraq's army numbered 70,000 men, some of whom were committed well away from the Shatt-al-Arab in deployments to Syria, Jordan, and against the Kurds in northern Iraq. Against those troops which were available for duty in southern Iraq, Iran could muster large portions of its 200,000 man army, which at that time was not engaged in any major combat deployment.[148] Likewise, Iran possessed a naval capability which Iraq could not match (Tables 1 and 2).

With these factors in mind the Iranian government quickly called Iraq's military bluff. Voiding the 1937 Frontier Treaty on April 19, it ordered the Iranian military to escort Iranian freighters down the Shatt-al-Arab on April 22 and 25, 1969.[149] In the face of Iranian military resolve, Iraq backed down, making no serious attempt to carry out its threat. Iranian de facto use of the waterway was thus established,[150] and the Iranians continued to use the river under that principle until the 1975 settlement.

The political results of the two incidents are interesting. In the earlier crisis, although Iraq had the military advantage, by opting for a non-military solution, it failed to achieve the political goal of obtaining complete control over the Shatt-al-Arab. Had it pressed the matter militarily it is likely that goal would have been achieved. In the 1969 crisis, when the advantage lay with Iran, its political goal of unrestricted passage on the waterway

was achieved. This success is largely attributable to the decisive manner in which Iran used its military power.

The use of military persuasion has not been the only diplomatic maneuver employed by the Iranians. Although the lesson on the value of forceful action in achieving political aims had been learned by the Iranians, it was only one viable option for the settlement of their disputes. The 1970 Iranian decision to abandon its claim to Bahrain is a case in point.

After Great Britain declared its intention of withdrawing from the Gulf and its intention of creating an Arab federation of the lower Gulf, Iran reasserted its historical claim to the island of Bahrain and "a number of other Gulf islands as well."[151] It has been suggested that Iran advanced this claim merely as a temporary strategem to show Gulf interest while it attempted to devise a broader Gulf policy.[152] While this theory may have some validity, it disregards the fact that Iran had been pursuing a Gulf-oriented security policy since 1965. To say that Iran was diplomatically unprepared for Britain's announcement after it had been militarily preparing for such a decision for three years is a little difficult to believe. It is more likely that the claim was advanced after serious consideration, with the full intention of obtaining sovereignty over Bahrain. Had Iran decided to press its claim militarily it stood a good chance of succeeding, but, in so doing, the country would have placed itself in an untenable diplomatic situation. Iran's occupation of Bahrain by military force would have been of little value in the face of united Arab diplomatic opposition, which was virtually assured in this case, since the Iranian claim had provided a rallying point for both revolutionary and conservative Arab states.[153] After state visits to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the Shah

realized that by relinquishing his claim to Bahrain, and thus removing a major point of friction, friendlier relations with Saudi Arabia could be established. These could ultimately lead to Saudi help for another Iranian political objective, that of excluding outside powers from the Gulf.[154] The Iranian decision to abandon its claim to Bahrain, then, was not due to a lack of military capability, rather, it was politically motivated for the purpose of achieving other goals.

That Iran could have succeeded militarily was demonstrated a few months after the Shah relinquished Iran's claim to Bahrain. In a co-ordinated military exercise held near the Persian island of Beni Farur in November 1970, Iran displayed its newly-acquired mobile strike capability. The Iranian news coverage of the exercise reported that Iran's military planning had begun to bear fruit and that the country would be in a position to exercise undisputed leadership in the Gulf after the British withdrawal.[155] This type of Persian saber rattling, coming when it did, was designed to impress the Arabs with Iranian military flexibility and to prove that the abandonment of the Bahrain claim was not due to a lack of Iranian military resolve. It was also to serve as a dress rehearsal for the seizure of three Gulf islands which occurred almost exactly one year later.

Another of the reasons Iran gave up its claim to Bahrain was in the hope of obtaining British and Arab support for its claim on the "other Gulf islands."[156] These other Gulf islands, identified in early 1970 as Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tumbs, were strategically located near the strait of Hormuz. As in the case of Bahrain, the islands at one time had been Iran's possessions, but had been awarded to Sharjah and Ras al-Kahaimah by the British prior to

1900.[157] The major reason advanced for the Iranian claim was the overriding Iranian foreign policy concern of the period, the uninterrupted passage of oil. The Shah reasoned that if the islands fell into "irresponsible hands" the sea lanes through the Straits could be interdicted very easily.[158]

The Shah first attempted to regain sovereignty over these islands by two non-military strategems; negotiations with the departing British, and a series of public actions designed to demonstrate to his Arab neighbors the seriousness of the Iranian claim. These actions included: (1) a February 1971 declaration by the Shah that Iran would resort to force, if necessary, in order to regain the islands; (2) an Iranian press campaign to mobilize public opinion in favor of the move; (3) British refusal, at Iranian insistance, to permit Occidental Petroleum to begin drilling operations near Abu Musa, and (4) Iranian offers of economic assistance to the Shiekhdoms in return for an agreement on the islands.[159] As the negotiations dragged on the Iranians increasingly adopted a harder line and began to opt for military persuasion. In May, Iran's armed forces were ordered to fire upon British aircraft in the Gulf which had been accused of harrassing Iranian forces.[160] Although this incident was smoothed over by the British, it had signaled Iran's determination to once again use its military power to gain Gulf political goals.

As the date for the inauguration of the British sponsored Arab federation drew closer, negotiations intensified. The Shah realized that if the new state were to receive international recognition with the Iranian claim still unsettled, any type of Iranian action to regain the islands would be much more difficult. For this reason, the deadline for the resolution of the problem was December 1, 1971, the date on which the United Arab Emirates (UAE) would be

formed.[161] An eleventh hour agreement was reached between the Shah and the ruling Shiekh of Sharjah which allowed joint occupation of Abu Musa in return for sharing of the oil resources located there.[162] No agreement could be arranged with the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, however. The day preceeding the formation of the UAE, Iran settled the issue by force of arms, occupying all three islands. In the landings on the Tumbs, a total of seven people were killed.[163]

The Iranian operation against the three islands must be viewed from two perspectives; the military and the diplomatic. Militarily, by occupying the islands Iran had denied their use to an enemy as a future base of operations against the shipping lanes and demonstrated the regional supremacy of the Iranian armed forces. The only military force indigenous to the Gulf which was capable of seriously resisting the Iranian invasion was Iraq's. Iraq had the necessary long range bombers (TU-16s) to reach the islands, but they could not have been supported by the short range Iraqi MIG-21s and would have been easy prey for the long range fighters and SAM-equipped ships of the Iranians. Nor did Iraq have a serious naval presence in the Gulf. With these critical capabilities lacking, the outcome was never in doubt.

From the diplomatic perspective the results are much more interesting. In the Shah's view, the operation accomplished a number of regional political objectives. It established the effectiveness of the Iranian military as a regional deterrent. Likewise, it was a clear indication to his neighbors of his seriousness concerning Iranian military hegemony. Finally, it showed that he was intent on establishing this hegemony through every means available, military and diplomatic, despite any Arab protest.[164] On the other side of the Gulf the results were not perceived in the same way. Although

the reaction in Saudi Arabia was mild, in the shiekhdoms, and more importantly in Iraq, it was much more severe. The occupation alarmed the inhabitants of the shiekhdoms and created doubts concerning Iran's ultimate intentions. There were some anti-Iranian riots which caused some property damage, but very little else.[165] The virulent Iraqi reaction, including the severence of diplomatic relations with Iran and the sponsoring of a protest against it in the United Nations,[166] indicates that had Iraq possessed the military capability necessary to effectively oppose the Iranian action, it probably would have done so. This also means that in 1971, however unwillingly, Iraq recognized the existence of Iranian military hegemony. It is highly doubtful that Iraq still does. Given the Iraqi arms acquisitions that have taken place in the last five years, especially the long range MIG-23 fighters and the possible recent contract for MIG-25s and missile equipped frigates, were the same operation to take place today, the results might be very different.

The above discussion has centered on the role the Iranian military capability has played in Persian Gulf politics. Like its Persian neighbor, Iraq has periodically used its military capability to pursue political ends. When Kuwait received its independence from Great Britain in June 1961, Iraq laid claim to the whole of Kuwait; however, in the face of British and Arab League diplomatic and military opposition it failed to press its claim.[167] In this instance Iraq lacked the will to militarily support its political decision over the objections of its sister Arab states. Iraq extended diplomatic recognition to Kuwait in 1963, however, the international boundary between the two countries has never been demarcated, leaving open the possibility of the reassertion of Iraq's claim.[168]

This practice of acceding to regional opposition was to be repeated when the border dispute flared up again. In late 1972, after Kuwait refused to grant Iraq a loan, the latter massed troops in the border area. Over the next few months negotiations were carried out between the two states seeking agreement on an Iraqi request to construct an oil pipeline across Kuwaiti territory,[169] but these talks were to become stalled over Kuwaiti fears that the Soviet Union might build the pipeline. After this breakdown Iraq advanced a claim for two large islands in the vicinity of Umm Qasr, a commercial and naval base being developed near the Kuwaiti border.

In March 1973, for the expressed purpose of expanding the defense perimeter around Umm Qasr, Iraq attacked a Kuwaiti border post in the area. Although Iraq received highly visible moral support from the Soviet Union by the visit of the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy and a contingent of Soviet naval ships during the crisis, it did not achieve its stated political goal.[170] Iraq pulled its troops out of the area on April 7 in the face of strong regional objections and offers of assistance to Kuwait from both Saudi Arabia and Iran. As in the 1961 border crisis and the Shatt-al-Arab crisis of the same year, Iraq was unwilling to "go to the wall" militarily to support its political decision. It should not be assumed that because of this lack of resolve Iraq lacked the military capability to achieve its goal or that its reluctance to fully utilize its capability will be repeated in future disputes.

In 1973 Iraq possessed 224 combat aircraft, a 90,000 man, well-equipped army and a light offensive naval capability (three OSA class FPBs armed with STYX SSM), which could be effective in areas with restricted maneuvering room, such as the approaches to Umm Qasr.[171] In addition, it had the public support of the Soviet

Union which could and probably would provide whatever additional military assistance was required. With these facts in mind it should be apparent that it was not the prospect of military action which forced Iraq to back down, but the diplomatic pressure resulting from the Arab League's opposition. Since the leaders of the Iraqi regime were pan-Arab in sentiment[172] the prospect of isolation within the Arab world was not appealing to them. Although the border conflict died down after the withdrawal, the dispute has yet to be resolved and is currently flaring up again.

Ostensibly as a result of the Kuwaiti government's dissolution of the Kuwaiti National Assembly, Iraq's armed forces crossed the Kuwaiti border on September 9, 1976, penetrating as deep as five miles.[173] The Kuwaiti response to this territorial incursion has been more restrained than in the 1973 dispute. The government has viewed the incursion as an action designed to compliment the political warfare the Iraqis have been waging over the dismissal of the National Assembly, which silenced public leftist dissent in Kuwait. Since a good portion of Iraq's armed forces are tied up along the Syrian border and Iraq's war with the Kurds seems to be renewing itself, it appears that Iraq's military infringement of Kuwaiti territory is more bluff and bluster than a serious attack.[174] Kuwait has appealed to individual Arab governments (Egypt and Syria) and formally threatened Iraq with a complaint to the Arab League, but appears not to feel as seriously threatened as it was in the 1973 dispute.[175] Iraq's actions are very similar to those which it took in the 1969 Shatt-al-Arab crisis, when it was in a poor position to militarily support its decisions.

Although the current border dispute may not seem too serious from the Kuwaiti point of view, serious doubts exist as to the

ultimate stability of the border, especially in view of the recent Iraqi arms contract that has apparently been signed with the Soviet Union. The increased Soviet support and military presence in Iraq that this contract implies may provide the impetus for a serious border clash with Kuwait in the future. To cast further doubt on its ultimate intentions, Iraq is presently cultivating the support of the various national liberation movements of the Middle East, such as the Palestine Revolution Political Committee, the People's Front for the Liberation of Baluchistan, the Front for the Liberation of Eritrea, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman.[176] If Iraq ultimately places more political value on its associations with these groups and the Soviet Union than it does on its relations with the Arab League states, it is quite possible that, when the next border flare-up occurs, Iraq will fully utilize its military capability despite objections or intervention by the Arab League or Iran.

In the pursuit of its Gulf political objectives, Saudi Arabia has not relied on its military capability as heavily as has Iran or Iraq. As mentioned above, one of the overriding concerns of Saudi Gulf policy has been the preservation of traditional monarchial rule by a staunch opposition to opposing ideologies. In the settlement of disputes with traditional states, Saudi Arabia has generally ignored the existence of its military capability. On the other hand, when non-traditional ideologies have been involved, the Saudis have relied upon their military capability in one way or another.

In the long standing dispute with Abu Dhabi over the Buraimi Oasis, the only military action occurred in 1955 when a Saudi police detachment was forcibly evicted from one of the villages by the Trucial Oman Scouts.[177] By the time the British left the Gulf in 1971, the Saudis possessed a large enough military capability to

settle the issue by force of arms if it had chosen to do so (Table 3), but by this time the communal interest of both states in preserving the traditional mode of rule had become apparent. The 1974 peaceful settlement in which Saudi Arabia recognized Abu Dhabian sovereignty over six of the disputed villages in return for a division of disputed oil field demonstrates this point.[178]

The military reaction of the Saudi government to opposing ideologies was demonstrated fairly early by its participation in the Yemeni civil war. It was followed up in December 1971, when, at the request of Sultan Qabus of Oman, King Faisal pledged financial and military assistance to him for use against the rebels in Dhofar.[179] Likewise, the Saudis have actively opposed the activities of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman in all parts of the Gulf.[180] During the 1973 Iraqi-Kuwaiti border crisis Saudi Arabia moved some of its military forces into position along the Saudi-Iraqi border and offered military assistance to the Kuwaiti government.[181] The use of military capabilities in these instances shows that the Saudis, like their more militarily active Gulf neighbors, will use their military capability to seek political goals. Although the military capability available for opposing these forces has been fairly small in the past, the expanded Saudi military described earlier in this paper can provide a much more potent and effective tool for opposing the non-traditional ideologies.

C H A P T E R I I I

MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL STABILITY

The discussion of military capabilities and power politics presented thus far has focused solely on international political objectives. It has been pointed out that a country's success or failure in reaching these objectives has not rested entirely on the overt use of superior military strength, but has often hinged upon the strength of resolve the government has displayed. One of the major factors which contributes to a government's strength of resolve in foreign affairs is its domestic political stability. Conversely, actual or threatened domestic political instability can rapidly erode a government's strength of resolve and render it incapable of positive action in international power politics. What must be explored at this point is the key element of Persian Gulf politics: The question of political stability and its relationship to the ever-increasing military capabilities described above.

The relationship has two equally important aspects: first, that political instability may adversely affect the development or maintenance of a viable military capability; and second, that military capability may adversely affect political stability. The distinction between the two aspects is not as clear as might be expected. In practice they tend to overlap and become interdependent. Because of this interdependence it is difficult to discuss them separately

for each of the Gulf states. Consider the following: The keys to the effectiveness of a military organization are the non-quantifiable dimensions of manpower, such as discipline, efficiency, motivation, and morale. By creating suspicion, distrust, and dissension within the ranks, political instability can adversely affect the manpower element of a military capability. Likewise, dissatisfaction with existing domestic political processes may prompt military commanders to force political change through extra-legal means. As officers are absorbed into politics or are removed for political reasons subsequent to this change, the turnover of military commands can erode the discipline and efficiency within the military. Excessive politization of the officer corps can turn the military from a force in the service of the state into a tool used for hegemony within the state. Once this occurs, not only is military capability weakened, but the foundations of the stability of the state are undermined as well.[182] This scenario has been played out in full in only one Persian Gulf state, Iraq, but both Iran and Saudi Arabia have experienced at least some of its elements.

In its relatively short 45 year history as an independent state, Iraq has experienced a disproportionate amount of military intervention in its domestic politics. In that span it has witnessed two separate periods of domestic political instability in which the military has played a decisive role. The first of these began in October 1936 when the acting Chief of Staff of the Iraqi army forced the ruling monarch to form a new government. It ended in May 1941 with the total defeat of the Iraqi armed forces by the invading allies. In that span of five years, military intervention in domestic politics resulted in a total of seven coups d'etat. This period, with its dramatic denouement, presents strong evidence

of the relationship between military capabilities and domestic political stability.[183]

Iraq's political stability was initially upset by one man, Brigadier Bakr Sidqi, who used the existing military capability to inject his personal political ideas into the domestic political arena. This established a precedent not only for his fellow officers of the Iraqi army but also for dissatisfied officers throughout the Arab world.[184] Domestic politics degenerated into a battleground in which various factions of the army and the civilian leadership struggled for power. Although the military had a significant role in each government that was formed during this period, it was not until the seventh coup in April 1941 that total control of the civilian government was in the hands of the military.[185] During the five year struggle, the primary attention of the competing officers was necessarily on the political situation with concomitant lack of attention to the military units they still commanded. In a military force the results of command neglect are predictable: initial confusion, sagging morale, a drop in motivation, a lack of initiative, and eventual alienation. All of this adds up to a severe loss of combat effectiveness. Considering the inept resistance which was offered by it to the British occupation forces, it is highly probable that such a progression took place within the Iraqi army. One reason which has been advanced for the swift, humiliating defeat of that army in 1941 is the excessive politization of its officer corps.[186] In their preoccupation with domestic politics, these officers neglected their troops. Thus, they forfeited their opportunity to instill in their men those mandatory ingredients of effective military strength: motivation and morale. In this instance political instability adversely affected the maintenance of a viable military capability.

The second period of Iraqi domestic political instability in which the military played the dominant role began with the overthrow of the Hashimite dynasty in July 1958 and has continued to the present day. This period like its predecessor, has been marked by a succession of coups, counter-coups, and attempted coups. In each of these, the existence of a military capability has been a common, decisive ingredient of instability, though it cannot be said to have been the sole instigating factor. The record of the 1958 revolution provides the best evidence to support this contention.

The forces which culminated in the brief but violent revolution in July 1958 had been brewing for several years, but had been kept in check by the monarchial government. The government under Nuri al-Said was stern and authoritarian, relying heavily on the army, the secret police, and a controlled press.[187] Between the reestablishment of civilian authority in 1941 and the July Revolution, the army publicly seemed to be in agreement with the government and loyal to the throne. During this period it provided help when needed to suppress violent opposition to governmental policies, e.g., the 1952 Baghdad riots over the issue of direct elections and the 1956 riots following the Suez crisis.[188] During the early 1950s with the aid of increased oil revenues Nuri was able to institute major economic reforms. Despite such measures, he became an object of hatred and vilification for his authoritarian methods and close associations with the British. He made an effort to maintain the loyalty of the officer corps by providing favorable terms of service and pension requirements, however, these were only partially successful.[189] Nuri may have felt fairly secure because of the army's public support of the government, his efforts at appeasing the office corps, and his success in economic reform, but he made a fatal error

in underestimating the extent to which discontent permeated both the military and civilian population.

In the intensely nationalistic atmosphere of Iraq in the early 1950s, Nuri's cautious reform programs only succeeded in alienating him from large segments of the Iraqi civilian population. The officer corps likewise had become disaffected and divided. It was split into two distinct, though informal groups: those older, generally more senior officers identified with the interests of the monarchy; and the younger, more junior officers from the middle and lower classes who represented the forces of intense nationalism and radical change. In 1952, under the influence of the successful Egyptian Revolution, several groups of officers formed secret cells for the purpose of contemplating military intervention in domestic politics.[190] In the years which followed, these largely uncoordinated secret groups expanded, attracting many young officers to the philosophy of radical change. Though there was much discussion and planning in these groups and their influence was deeply felt in the military, no overt military action resulted.[191] The 1956 exposure and neutralization of one very influential group temporarily paralyzed the movement, but the nominal leadership was assumed by Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qassem shortly thereafter. His group, known as the Baghdad Organization, developed into the leading group proposing military intervention.[192]

The widespread dissatisfaction with domestic political processes had lain the groundwork for the revolution. Throughout this period of secret activity within the officer corps, close contacts were maintained with sympathetic civilian politicians. Because of the diversity of political opinion, i.e., moderate nationalism, pan-arabism, pro-communism, and Ba'athist socialism, each group contacted

separate politicians from whom they received guidance, encouragement, and support.[193] Although the revolution was the result of planning by only seven military officers, it received the immediate support of much of the civilian population. The military took control of the government, but the new regime included many prominent civilian politicians.[194] Although the military capability provided the vehicle, it cannot be said that the military was solely responsible for the revolution. Civilian participation in the pre-revolution secret activities was an important factor.

After the revolution, the ruling military-civilian coalition did not last long and a struggle for power quickly developed among the military officers. Within three months the first attempt to remove Qassem occurred. Colonel Abd al-Salam Muhammed Arif, who had been Qassem's major supporter immediately prior to and during the revolution, led the attempt. Qassem suppressed the move and immediately began to suppress the political groups which had originally collaborated with him.[195] As Qassem turned the Iraqi government into a military dictatorship, he transformed the army into a personal political tool. The manner in which he carried this out, i.e., a purge of the officers who disagree with him, became a pattern that was repeated often in the later Iraqi corps. In November 1963, Arif used the same technique to eliminate the Ba'athist civilians who had come to power with him nine months earlier. For a period of years the army again was in complete control.[196] After the Ba'athists regained power by joining forces with the moderates in a July 1968 coup, they purged the non-Ba'athist elements in another coup only two weeks later.[197] After an aborted conservative coup in September 1968, the Ba'athist government led by President (Major General) Ahmed Hassan Bakr began a long purge to "uproot foreign influence and

liquidate the pockets of counter-revolution" which included numerous arrests, imprisonments, and executions.[198]

The period after 1958 was marked by constant political turmoil. Army intervention in domestic politics became a fact of life and the officer corps was purged to some degree by every government that came to power. This process had a deliterious effect on the army and resulted in a severe drop in morale among the troops. Further, the rapid command changes along with a general climate of political instability had a serious effect on the morale and performance of the military.[199] As in the 1936-1941 period, military capability suffered greatly due to political instability. The generally poor showing of the Iraqi army against the Kurds in the 1960s is evidence of this. After consolidating their hold on Iraqi politics in the late 1960s, the Ba'athist government made an attempt to reverse this trend and to impose a measure of stability on the Iraqi army by isolating it from politics. According to one observer this isolation has stabilized the officer corps and has provided a base for regaining in the 1970s the morale and efficiency which was lost in the 1960s.[200]

The isolation hypothesis requires closer scrutiny. The isolation of the officer corps means that military opposition had been removed from influential political positions. Advancement in the Iraqi officer corps was made dependent upon membership in the Ba'ath party, but this did not mean isolation or even depolitization of the army. It was merely an attempt to fit all of the officers into one political mold, an attempt which has not been entirely successful.[201] In July 1973 there were reports of a non-Ba'athist coup attempt from within the army followed by a large scale purge of the military.[202] Even though the government may eliminate all the

supporters of opposing ideologies, it does not mean political stability will be achieved. Given the volatility of Iraqi politics and the history of military intervention, in that country, it is not unlikely that sometime in the future an Iraqi officer, even though he may be a Ba'athist, may decide that only he can properly lead the country. When this occurs, it will provide new evidence of the interdependence of Iraqi military capability and Iraqi domestic political instability.

In contrast to the chronic instability that has characterized Iraq's domestic politics over the last two decades, Iran has been relatively stable. It has been stable in that it has not witnessed a succession of Iraqi-style coups d'etat which have weakened both the government and the military. Nonetheless, Iran has experienced some of the individual elements of the Iraqi patterns of political instability. Like Iraq, Iran has a history of military intervention in civilian politics. Unlike Iraq, one man has been able to maintain control of the military, using it to impose political stability despite the presence of deep destabilizing elements. Rather than political instability adversely affecting military capability, the relative calm which has prevailed on the domestic scene has enabled the Shah to develop a viable military capability.

Twentieth century Iran's history of military intervention in domestic politics predates that of modern Iraq. In 1921 Reza Khan, in command of 2500 Persian Cossacks, led a successful coup d'etat enabling a respected civilian, Seyyid Zia ed-Din Tabataba'i, to take control of the government.[203] As a reward for his services Reza Khan was given command of the entire army. His rise to national power and his maintenance of that power as shah was based largely on his control of Iran's military capability. By using that

capability to subjugate rebellious tribes and to generate widespread physical security, he was able to increase his personal power and assume positions of greater authority in the government. After he established the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925, Reza Shah was able to impose a political stability on the country which lasted until his power base, the army, collapsed in World War II.[204] One American scholar has indicated that Reza Shah's dominant goal was the creation of a modern army strong enough to maintain internal control and which would constitute a significant deterrant to foreign armed aggression.[205] Main goal or not, the military capability which he created kept him in control of Iran's domestic politics for sixteen years, a fact not lost on his son. By example Reza Shah defined for his successor the most productive relationship between military capability and Iranian domestic stability. The fact that the father's vaunted military capability turned out to be a house of cards did not lessen the impact of the precedent on the son.

After he very nearly lost the throne in the political crisis of 1953, Muhammed Reza Shah resurrected his father's method of rule. In order to stabilize domestic politics by expanding his control over the Iranian government (as Reza Shah had done) he needed the military as a power base. Unlike his father, though, the Shah did not enjoy the full loyalty of the army. There existed in the military substantial support for both the National Front and the Tudeh Party. With the memories of the Mossadegh period still fresh, as well as the 1949 Syrian and 1952 Egyptian coups, it was vital that these elements be purged. The purge was carried out immediately, resulting in the removal of hundreds of officers and non-commissioned officers and the execution of some two dozen officers.[206] To ensure the loyalty of future officers, the Shah took upon himself the

responsibility for granting all promotions above the rank of major, granting them only a personal examination of the officer's service record. He also required that all junior promotions be made subject to his approval. After the 1954 purge he began forcing out of the service incompetent or corrupt officers as well as any officer of questionable loyalty, the number of which by 1963 had exceeded 1000 officers.[207] He extended his personal supervision so far as to forbid any meeting between general officers without his express permission, and began to personally make all major command assignments, including putting senior military men in charge of ostensibly civilian organizations such as the gendarmerie and the national police.[208]

In addition to these direct supervisory measures, the Shah began a process of co-optation designed to instil loyalty in his officers. To satisfy their combat needs he began negotiating for and receiving more significant quantities of American military aid, as outlined earlier in this paper. To satisfy their non-combat needs the Shah began giving them special prerogatives. He increased their pay, built them new housing units, established a sumptuous officer's club in Tehran, and allowed special importation privileges.[209] For the senior officers there was the vitally important additional benefit of sharing in the expanding power of the Shah. As long as they enjoyed his favor, the senior officers were assured of significant participation in the new military dominated state the Shah was creating.

During this lengthy co-optation process, the Shah was using the military to enforce political stability. The imposition of martial law from 1953 to 1957 and again after the 1963 riots was only the most dramatic expression of this fact. Whenever the police or gendamerie proved unable to maintain order, the army did so quite

ruthlessly.[210] As pointed out above, the leadership of the civilian security organs was passed to military officers, including, after its creation, the State Security and Intelligence Organization (SAVAK). The treasonable offenses uncovered by these organizations have all, since 1954, been tried before military courts. An increasing number of purely civilian administrative posts have been given to high ranking military officers including positions in the cabinets, governorships, municipal posts, and numerous lesser positions throughout the civil bureaucracy. After the institution of the Shah's reform measures in 1963, the military assumed the added responsibility of the organization and administration of three of the major reform programs--the Literacy Corps, the Health Corps, and the Development and Rural Extension Corps.[211] Through this process of militarizing the government, the Shah created the domestic political stability necessary for sustained economic growth and freedom of action in foreign affairs.

The Shah's consolidation and extension of power was not without serious opposition from within the armed forces. In separate incidents two generals, both chiefs of security organizations, were charged with planning coups. In 1958 the head of army intelligence, General Gharani, was exposed as the ringleader of a plot to overthrow the government. This plot, reportedly exposed only at the last minute, implicated two notable civilian politicians as well; Ali Amini and Hasan Arsanjani.[212] Four years later, General Timur Bakhtiar, the former head of SAVAK, was rumored to be engineering a coup against the Shah himself and was forced to leave the country for exile in Europe.[213]

Bakhtiar's demotion and exile is but one example of the methods used by the Shah to maintain control of the armed forces.

As has been pointed out in various studies, another method the Shah uses is playing the heads of competing organizations against one another creating tensions between them and reducing the likelihood of one becoming too powerful.[214] If a military officer is in a position to gain what the Shah considers too much power or influence he is subject to rapid retirement, demotion, or transfer. For example, in militarized Iran, with a rapidly developing military capability, the position of Chief of Staff of the armed forces is an extremely important and influential post. When the occupant accrues more power than the Shah intended him to have he is immediately replaced by another four-star general. The Shah's pattern has been well established. In 1966 General Hijazi, who had been in the position for a number of years was retired without warning. In 1969 his replacement, General Ariyana was likewise retired. Two years later General Firaydun Jam was suddenly removed and appointed Ambassador to Spain, an action which was tantamount to political exile. It is conceivable that these demotions and retirements were motivated by other factors, but given the Shah's practice of manipulating the politically influential members of Iranian society,[215] such a conclusion is unlikely.

As a power base in his quest for political stability, economic prosperity and Iranian hegemony in Persian Gulf affairs, Muhammed Reza Shah has relied primarily on his ability to control and maintain the loyalty of the Iranian armed forces. To date he has been extraordinarily successful. By his co-optation efforts, he has apparently created an officer corps that is not only loyal to the throne, but to him personally. Although he has gone to great lengths to keep them satisfied, there is always the danger that some ambitious, reform-minded officer who is carefully watching for signs

of domestic discontent may decide that his moment has come. Because of the existence of the state intelligence networks, such a politically ambitious officer would have to be especially astute in order to succeed.[216] For this reason the danger to the Shah from this quarter is fairly remote. For this reason the danger to the Shah from this quarter is fairly remote. For the forseeable future the Pahlavi definition of the relationship between political stability and military capability will prevail. Unless the Shah simultaneously alienates members of the intelligence establishment and the military, thereby creating a situation in which members of both groups could find mutuality of purpose, the system he has created will, in all probability, detect and eliminate any serious opposition developing from within.

Like its Persian neighbor across the Gulf, Saudi Arabia has maintained its domestic political stability for a number of years, though since the early 1960s it has witnessed significant signs of political discontent. Despite the modernizing efforts of the government, several military-civilian plots against the government have been uncovered. There is no Saudi history of Iraqi-style intervention in domestic politics, but in the last decade substantial numbers of young military officers have been implicated in anti-monarchial activities. One man has maintained overall control of the military, enabling a broad military capability to be developed, but since the forces are not united in purpose, there exists the potential for the military capability to be used to upset the political stability of the state.

As indicated in Table 4, the armed forces of Saudi Arabia, like those of Iran and Iraq, are divided into regular and para-military forces. In Saudi Arabia, though, the para-military National

Guard has a special significance. It is the modern outgrowth of the tribal force known as the White Army which Ibn Saud used to consolidate his power in the early part of the century.[217] Because the majority of the members of the National Guard are drawn from the tribes of the Najd district, which constituted the mainstay of Ibn Saud's power, the Guard is considered to be loyal to the royal house and has been given the primary mission of preserving internal security.[218] Preserving internal security means, among other things, protecting the throne from insurgency arising from the regular military. Although relatively small in size, the National Guard has served as a significant counterweight to the regular forces since military modernization began under King Faisal.

The modernization of the regular armed forces was a calculated risk for the Saudi government. Their primary mission being protection of the country from external attack,[219] it was vital they be capable of repelling a modern armed force, but the government was also aware of the revolutionary potential of a modern military establishment. Faced with the militant opposition of non-traditional Arab ideologies of Egypt and Iraq, the Saudis embarked on the expansion and modernization program outlined earlier in this paper. At the beginning of the program the capability of the two forces was roughly equal in terms of manpower and equipment,[220] but as the army absorbed the new technology a severe imbalance was created, necessitating a modernization of the National Guard which was begun in 1973 (Table 3).

One of the key factors in maintaining control of the armed forces is keeping the loyalty of the officer corps. For good reason the Saudi government considered the loyalty of the regular officers somewhat suspect. It was remembered that during the Civil War in

Yemen nine air force pilots defected with their planes to Nasser's forces, necessitating the grounding of the entire air force.[221] To cause further distrust, many young officers were implicated in the violent activities of the underground group called the Union of the Arab Peninsula in 1966 and early 1967. These officers were arrested, but as modernization continued and the demand for better-educated officers grew, the government was forced to replace them with individuals whose loyalty to the house of Saud was no less suspect.[222] Two well-informed observers of Gulf affairs have suggested that the Government attempted to co-opt the regular officers by satisfying their professional desire for advanced weaponry and by offering liberal terms of service.[223] Just as these measures did not work for General Nuri in monarchial Iraq, they have not worked in Saudi Arabia. By 1969, opposition to the Saudi government was fairly widespread in the armed forces, as evidenced by the arrests which followed two abortive coups in June and September. In addition to the younger officers and civilian intellectuals who took part in a conspiracy against the monarchy, a number of senior officers filling key defense positions were also involved. Among those arrested were the director of the air force academy, a former Chief of Staff of the regular army, senior officers of the ministries of defense, interior and aviation, and the commanders of military garrisons.[224] The scope of the organization which planned the coups, reported to have included cells in all the major towns of the country, led to several hundred arrests.[225] Despite this crackdown there were reports of another plot in early 1970, and still another was uncovered in 1972.[226] In October 1974, several National Guard officers suspected of plotting against the regime were arrested,

indicating that discontent was spreading even to those forces considered most loyal to the royal house.[227]

Although the Saudi government has been successful in keeping the lid on the political system, the number of plots that have been uncovered in the last decade and the level of military participation in them does not bode well for the future. The bulk of the military is still considered to be loyal to the crown,[228] but how long it will remain so is at least open to question. As the technical complexity of the armed forces increases, the number of progressive, technically-oriented officers in key military positions will likewise increase. If the Saudi government, even with its vast development plans, fails to satisfy the inner needs of men like these, the days of the Saudi monarchy will be numbered. With the 1969 coup attempts as precedents, it is not difficult to conceive of a broad underground organization using the developing military capability to bring down the house of Saud.

C H A P T E R I V

CONCLUSIONS

At the beginning of this paper it was pointed out that Iran and Iraq had amicably settled their long-standing dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab. Subsequently the two governments were talking about a regional security structure to eliminate foreign military alliance and interference, raising hopes among observers for the ultimate security of the region. Although such a structure would be highly desirable and could serve to alter significantly the patterns of the use of military power developed in this paper, it has yet to be created. Iraq has not been living up to the spirit of its agreements with Iran and the Arab Gulf states have been reluctant to support the pact because it would formally recognize Iran's predominant position in the Gulf.[229] Without their concurrence and the full support of Iraq, a Gulf security pact cannot be formed, let alone be maintained. Unless such an arrangement can be concluded, the political future of the Persian Gulf is uncertain.

As can be seen from Table 4, the 1976 balance of military capability rests with Iran, but since the Irano-Iraqi arms race is continuing, this may change in the future. Whatever arms agreement has been signed between Iraq and the Soviet Union, it can be viewed as evidence of this continuing arms race. If the Iranian press reports are to be believed, Iran now considers Iraq more of a threat to regional stability than before the 1975 reapproachment. The

Iranian perception is that Iraq will receive strong Soviet support for future territorial claims against Persian Gulf states.[230] The Iraqi-Irano goodwill of the spring of 1975 had deteriorated into distrust and suspicion by the fall of 1976.

Since the 1975 agreement, the Iranians have been given some valid reasons to distrust the Iraqi intentions. During 1976 Iraq had been supporting radical elements in South Yemen and the lower Gulf states which have been making serious efforts to undermine the stability of the regimes in Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain.[231] The agitation of these elements played a major role in the Kuwaiti government's decision to dissolve the Parliament[232] which, as discussed above, was the stated reason for the recent Iraqi incursion into Kuwaiti territory. The Iranian response to the territorial infringement has been less than in 1973, probably because of the attitude of the Kuwaitis and the support they have received from other Arab states. A more serious attempt by Iraq to unilaterally delineate its border with Kuwait will probably create broad Arab support for Kuwait, making Iranian intervention unnecessary. If, however, strong Arab military support does not materialize, as in the case of Oman, Iranian military involvement is almost a certainty. The Shah has publicly stated that Iran will not tolerate a seizure of Kuwait by Iraq.[233]

The Shah's policy can be extended beyond Kuwait. If any traditional Gulf government is seriously threatened by left-wing forces, a strong Iranian response can be expected. The Arab distrust of Iran is overshadowed by the desire of conservative Arab rulers to remain in power, as can be seen from the Omani request for Iranian military aid to fight the Dhofar rebels.[234] In keeping with its role as self-appointed guarantor of Gulf stability, Iran's

response would, if required, include military action. Although it is probable that the threatened government would request, or at least accede to offered Iranian military assistance, the possibility that Iran would intervene without permission must be considered.

Another possible scenario for the use of the Iranian military capability in Gulf politics is that if domestic support for the Shah deteriorates sufficiently, he could use an external military venture to build up his popularity. It has been reported that one of the real motives behind the 1971 seizure of the Gulf islands was the Shah's desire to restore his sagging prestige after failing to press the Iranian claim to Bahrain and to "enhance his image as a forceful and decisive monarch."[235] Whether or not the report is true is beside the point. The Shah would not be the first leader in history to make such an attempt, and such a situation is certainly conceivable.

For their part, the Saudis will probably continue to play a relatively minor military role in Gulf affairs for the next few years. The resources required for the execution of their monumental $100 billion second economic development plan should preoccupy the Saudis internally. However, if the above scenario of a traditional government in trouble is played out, it can be expected that Saudi Arabia will play a significant role. Although they are rapidly acquiring a large military capability, the severe Saudi manpower problems discussed above could limit the employment of the capability. This limitation could restrict the Saudi military response to the scenario, but, if the Saudis resort again to hiring mercenaries, their burgeoning capability could be employed effectively.

The x-factor in Persian Gulf power politics is the domestic stability of the major governments. Each state faces potential

opposition from within its military establishment and the stability of the entire region may well depend upon how one government controls these future challenges. If Iraq's Ba'athist/military government were to fall, it would probably merely result in a change of personalities, not of ideology. On the other hand, the fall of either the Iranian or Saudi Arabian government could presage a major shift in the regional balance of power. The fall of either might also precipitate a collapse of the other which would place great pressure for change on the smaller states of the Gulf.

The future of the Persian Gulf is tenuous, at best. The key difference between the existing situation and that of the recent past is the size and complexity of the arsenals which have been accumulated. On all sides the weapons are so powerful and the distances to potential targets so short, that a minor diplomatic tension not handled properly could rapidly become a major conflagration. With the military capabilities increasing almost daily, it is difficult, if not impossible, to control indefinitely all of the forces involved. Yet, unless just such control is maintained the possibility of war by accident is all too high.

NOTES

[1]Washington Post, March 7, 1975, p. A1; and June 22, 1975, p. A22.

[2]R. M. Burrell, The Persian Gulf, The Washington Papers No. 1 (New York: The Library Press, 1972), p. 69.

[3]"Iraq Tries to Boost Gulf Security," Washington Post, April 28, 1975, p. A16; and "Iran Assuming Britain's Former Role as Guardian of Persian Gulf States," New York Times, May 7, 1975, p. 2.

[4]Paul Kinsinger, "Arms Purchases in the Pursian Gulf: The Military Dimension," U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, The Persian Gulf, 1975: The Continuing Debate on Arms Sales, Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1976, p. 230.

[5]Charles H. Percy, The Middle East, A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Congress, Senate, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 41.

[6]J. C. Hurewitz, Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 25.

[7]Robert B. Reppa, Sr., Israel and Iran: Bilateral Relationships and Effect on the Indian Ocean Basin (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 66.

[8]In response to the Soviet domination of Azerbaijan, the Truman Doctrine for Greece and Turkey was announced in March 1947. Iranians noted that in the accompanying State Department reorganization Iran was linked with Greece and Turkey. The United States also extended a military credit of $25 million. Sidney Nettleton Fisher, The Middle East, A History (2nd ed.; New York: Knopf, 1969), p. 523.

[9]Ibid., p. 524.

[10]Ibid., p. 497. For a complete listing of arms transfers to Iran during this early period see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Arms Trade with the Third World (New York: Humanities Press, 1971), pp. 840-842.

[11]SIPRI, p. 575. The Baghdad Pact was reorganized in CENTO in July 1958 following the Iraqi revolution. Fisher, p. 498.

[12]Reppa, p. 67.

[13]Harvey H. Smith et al., Area Handbook for Iran (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 305.

[14]SIPRI, pp. 840-842.

[15]Reppa, p. 67.

[16]Alvin J. Cottrell, "The Foreign Policy of the Shah," Strategic Review, III (Fall, 1975), p. 32.

[17]Reppa, p. 67; Cottrell, p. 34; George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972), p. 32.

[18]Cottrell, p. 34. In September 1962, Iran made a pledge to the Soviet Union not to allow the establishment of Western rocket sites on its territory. This was followed in 1965 to 1966 with agreements for Soviet assistance in the construction of industrial establishments to be repaid by shipments of natural gas. Lenczowski, pp. 31-33.

[19]SIPRI, pp. 840-842.

[20]Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1972), p. 42. A 1937 Frontier Treaty had placed the international boundary at the thalweg line in the vicinity of Abadan, but the Iraqi governments had never allowed the Iranians to participate in the administration of the waterway services. Since a great deal of Iran's commerce was carried on through this port the Iranians demanded participation. Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran, A Developing State in a Zone of Great Power Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 173.

[21]SIPRI, pp. 842-843.

[22]SIPRI, p. 577. There are conflicting reports about this transfer. SIPRI lists 91 F-5As and 15 F-5Bs transferred, however, the Reference Handbook on the Armed Forces of the World, first and second editions, credits Iran with only 90 F-5 fighters. Likewise, the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) lists only 90 F-5s in Iran by 1968. SIPRI indicates the mission of the F-5Bs to be trainers, but although each of the other sources list various training aircraft, none list F-5s in a mere training role. Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1971-72, lists the F-5B as a two-seat version of the F-5A supersonic tactical fighter with a dual fighter/trainer role. The most likely answer is that SIPRI listed 15 airplanes twice, i.e., once as F-5A fighters and again as F-5B trainers. SIPRI, pp. 816 and 841. Robert C. Sellers, The Reference Handbook on the Armed Forces of the World (Garden City, N.Y.: Sellers and Associates, 1966), unnumbered page: Iran and second edition, 1968, unnumbered page: Iran. ISS, The Military Balance 1968/69 (London: ISS, 1968), p. 33. Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1971-72 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), p. 370.

[23]SIPRI, p. 577.

[24]SIPRI, p. 578; and New York Times, September 14, 1967, p. 6.

[25]Jane's Fighting Ships 1975-76 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), pp. 178-180.

[26]The New York Times reported that the Shah considered Iran's independence "firmly established" and he would "turn to the Soviet Union for more arms if it seemed reasonable and necessary." New York Times, September 14, 1967, p. 6.

[27]Henry J. Kuss in Arms Sales to Near East and South Asian Countries, U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, p. 5.

[28]Aviation Week and Space Technology (AWST), November 23, 1970, p. 21.

[29]New York Times, September 14, 1967, p. 6.

[30]AWST, November 23, 1970, p. 21.

[31]Cottrell, p. 36.

[32]Arab Report and Record, June 1-5, 1969, quoted in SIPRI, p. 576.

[33]Jane's Aircraft, 1971-72, p. 348.

[34]SIPRI, p. 841. The Military Balance 1968/70 lists 40 additional UH-1D Iroquois helicopters as having been ordered from the U.S. for delivery beginning in 1970. Aviation Week and Space Technology, however, in a 1970 review of U.S.-Iranian aircraft contracts, omits the UH-1Ds. Likewise, succeeding editions of The Military Balance through 1976 fail to mention delivery of any UH-1Ds. Jane's Aircraft lists the UH-1D as the military version of the Bell 205 helicopter. It would appear that ISS mistakenly listed the 40 aircraft contract twice, once with the Italian government and again with the U.S. ISS, The Military Balance 1969/70, p. 60. AWST, November 23, 1970, p. 21. Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 247.

[35]Jane's Fighting Ships 1975-76, p. 181, and 1971-72, p. 172.

[36]The decision to purchase the Chieftain was directly influenced by Iraqi possession of the Soviet T-54 and T-55 main battle tanks. See Burrell, p. 25.

[37]ISS, Military Balance 1972-73, p. 77.

[38]Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 333. One of the interesting features of this long range capability is that by flying F-4 aircraft, refueled from the Boeing 707-320 tankers, Iran has an air strike capability in excess of 1400 nautical miles. It also allows fully loaded F-4s to reach any point in Pakistan from Iranian bases. R. M. Burrell and Alvin J. Cottrell, Iran, Afganistan, Pakistan: Tensions and Dilemmas, The Washington Papers, vol. II, no. 20 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 35.

[39]Cottrell, p. 36.

[40]T. B. Millar, "The Military-Strategic Balance" in Abbas Amirie, ed., The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in International

Politics (Tehran: Institute for International Political and Economic Studies, 1975), p. 393, footnote 4.

[41]Jane's Fighting Ships 1975-76, p. 179.

[42]Ibid., p. 182.

[43]ISS, Military Balance 1975/76, p. 80

[44]Christian Science Monitor, February 12, 1975, p. 3. The mean depth of the Persian Gulf is between 35 and 40 fathoms. U.S. Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic Center, Indian Ocean Northern Part, H.O. Chart 721, rev. July 19, 1975. Although submarine operations are entirely possible in these depths, submariners prefer to operate in depths exceeding 100 fathoms, which do not occur in the Gulf.

[45]U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Military Sales to Iran, Staff Report, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, p. VIII.

[46]Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 315.

[47]AWST, December 22, 1975, p. 23.

[48]Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 556.

[49]Ibid., p. 552.

[50]AWST, August 9, 1976, reported (pp. 23-24) that as of October 1976 Iran had taken delivery of approximately 18 F-14 aircraft with a follow-on delivery rate of three aircraft per month. It also reported that 270 of the 424 Phoenix missiles, about half of the 6700 TOW missiles and all of the Maverick missiles had been delivered.

[51]R. M. Burrell, personal interview, September 23, 1976.

[52]Senior U.S. Navy Aviator who wished to remain anonymous, personal interview, September 22, 1976.

[53]AWST, June 2, 1975, p. 309.

[54]AWST, September 2, 1974, p. 25.

[55]AWST, June 17, 1974, p. 14. See also Louis Kraar, "Grumman Still Flies for the Navy, but it is Selling the World," Fortune, February, 1976.

[56]World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook, 1975 (SIPRI Yearbook) (New York: Humanities Press, 1975), p. 209.

[57]AWST, August 9, 1976, p. 22.

[58]AWST, November 10, 1975, p. 17; and July 12, 1976, p. 9.

[59]Percy, p. 49. Estimates on the number of Americans who will be required to be in Iran by 1980 range from a conservative 40,000+ (Percy, p. 45) to 112,500 including dependents (Robert J. McCloskey, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations in Foreign Assistance Authorization: Arms Sales Issues, U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1976, p. 236).

[60]U.S. Military Sales to Iran, p. X.

[61]Washington Post, May 26, 1976, p. A14.

[62]Washington Post, July 5, 1976, p. A8 and Middle East Economic Digest, July 1976, p. 22.

[63]Washington Post, June 14, 1976, p. A15.

[64]U.S. Military Sales to Iran, p. XII.

[65]SIPRI, p. 554.

[66]Lenczowski, p. 128.

[67]SIPRI, p. 555.

[68]Lenczowski, p. 128.

[69]SIPRI, pp. 842-843.

[70]Lenczowski, p. 129; and SIPRI, p. 556.

[71]Ibid., pp. 842-843.

[72]Ibid.

[73]Chubin, p. 179.

[74]SIPRI, p. 843.

[75]Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 457.

[76]Lenczowski, p. 137.

[77]SIPRI, pp. 842-843.

[78]Ibid., p. 557.

[79]Jane's Aircraft 1964-65, p. 122.

[80]SIPRI, pp. 842-843.

[81]Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 444.

[82]ISS, Military Balance 1975/76, p. 34.

[83]SIPRI, p. 554.

[84]Jon D. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 27.

[85]SIPRI, pp. 557-558.

[86]Lenczowski, p. 139.

[87]SIPRI reports that Iraq took possession of 20 Soviet SU-7 tactical fighter bomber aircraft prior to the war and implies that Iraq lost interest in that aircraft after the war, preferring to obtain the French Mirage fighter. Glassman, Sellers and the ISS do not credit Iraq with any SU-7s during the Six Day War, however, the first mention of SU-7s by the ISS occurred late in 1968 when 20 were listed in Iraqi possession. It is likely that while compiling their data in 1970-71 SIPRI simply assumed the 1968 delivery took place before the war. SIPRI, pp. 557-558. Glassman, p. 27, Sellers, unmumbered page: Iraq. ISS, Military Balance 1967/68, p. 39 and 1968/69, p. 44.

[88]SIPRI, pp. 557-558; and ISS, Military Balance 1968/69, p. 58.

[89]SIPRI, p. 843; and Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 43.

[90]Chubin, p. 182.

[91]Comparison of ISS, Military Balance 1969/70, p. 34, and 1971/72, p. 28.

[92]Burrell, The Persian Gulf, p. 75.

[93]Ibid., p. 26.

[94]Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 570.

[95]Ibid., pp. 457 and 459.

[96]Glassman, pp. 116 and 126.

[97]New York Times, October 3, 1973, p. 10.

[98]In December, 1974, the Iranians shot down an Iraqi TU-16 and SU-7 using SAMs while the aircraft were flying over Kurdish territory. AWST, December 23, 1974, p. 34.

[99]Although the SA-7 had proven generally ineffective by itself in the war it was still being provided by the Soviet Union as some measure of air defense for infantry units. Glassman, pp. 127-128.

[100]AWST, March 11, 1974, p. 134; and Washington Post, September 12, 1974, p. A1. By 1975 there were reports that Iraqi pilots were flying the MIG-23s. Jane's Aircraft, 1976-76, p. 499.

[101]Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 572.

[102]Washington Post, February 1, 1975, p. A1.

[103]Ibid.

[104]Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 572.

[105]Lenczowski, p. 138.

[106]Middle East Economic Digest, 12 September 1975, p. 20.

[107]Kayhan International, October 20, 1976, p. 3; and Associated Press story in Philadelphia Enquirer, November 5, 1976, p. 3, and Los Angeles Times, November 5, 1976, p. 3.

[108]Philadelphia Enquirer, November 5, 1976, p. 3.

[109]Jane's Aircraft 1975-76, p. 500.

[110]Kayhan International, October 20, 1976, p. 3.

[111]James A. Bill and Robert W. Stookey, Politics and Petroleum: The Middle East and the United States (Brunswick, Ohio: King's Court Commissions, 1975), p. 21.

[112]SIPRI, p. 580.

[113]Ibid., p. 561; and Hurewitz, p. 14.

[114]SIPRI, pp. 848-849.

[115]Ibid., p. 561.

[116]Ibid.

[117]Ibid., pp. 848-849.

[118]Fisher, pp. 724-725.

[119]The Saudis did not trust the U.S.-created army and air force. When some Saudi pilots defected to the U.A.R. in 1962, the government grounded the entire air force. SIPRI, pp. 561-562.

[120]Ibid., pp. 562-563.

[121]Ibid., p. 564. The British were later replaced by Pakistanis, p. 565.

[122]Emile A. Nakhleh, The United States and Saudi Arabia: A Policy Analysis (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), p. 52.

[123]SIPRI, p. 565.

[124]Sellers, 1966 edition, unnumbered page: Saudi Arabia.

[125]ISS, Military Balance 1967/68, p. 40.

[126]Sellers, 2nd ed., unnumbered page: Saudi Arabia.

[127]ISS, Military Balance 1967/68 to 1971/72.

[128]Chubin, p. 229.

[129]For a discussion of Saudi Arabia civilian economic growth see Nakhleh, pp. 14-19.

[130]AWST, June 7, 1976, p. 22.

[131]Nakhleh, p. 18. ISS in The Military Balance 1975/76, reports the population of Saudi Arabia as 8,910,000 (p. 37) as opposed to Iran's 33,180,000 (p. 33).

[132]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, United States Arms Sales to the Persian Gulf, Study Mission Report, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 11.

[133]The 38 Mirage III fighter aircraft purchased from France are reportedly for transfer to Egypt. AWST, December 9, 1974, p. 23.

[134]New York Times, June 15, 1976, p. 53.

[135]Washington Post, April 6, 1974, p. A23.

[136]The U.S. recommendations include acquisition of 440 helicopters to outfit the forces. November 7, 1974, p. A26.

[137]Ann T. Schultz, "A Leadership Role for Iran in the Persian Gulf?" Current History 62 (January 1972), p. 28; and Emile A. Nakhleh, Arab-American Relations in the Persian Gulf (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), p. 39.

[138]Nakhleh, The United States and Saudi Arabia, pp. 51-52.

[139]Alvin J. Cottrell, "Iran, the Arabs and the Persian Gulf," Orbis 17 (Fall 1973), pp. 986-987; and Nakhleh, Arab-American Relations, p. 28.

[140]Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran 1500-1941, A Developing Nation in World Affairs (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1966), pp. 264-265.

[141]Burrell, The Persian Gulf, p. 72.

[142]Chubin, p. 173.

[143]Ibid.

[144]George M. Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States. Pt. 1: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan (New York: Speller and Sons, 1971), pp. 114 and 115.

[145]Chubin, p. 174.

[146]Ramazani, The Persian Gulf, Iran's Role, pp. 42-43.

[147]ISS, Military Balance 1969/70, p. 34.

[148]Ibid.; and Ramazani, The Persian Gulf, Iran's Role, p. 44.

[149]Ramazani, The Persian Gulf, Iran's Role, p. 44.

[150]Chubin, p. 186.

[151]Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1974: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1966), pp. 414-415.

[152]Chubin, pp. 219 and 221.

[153]Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973, pp. 414-415.

[154]Burrell, The Persian Gulf, p. 41.

[155]Cottrell, "Foreign Policy of the Shah," p. 34.

[156]Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973, pp. 414-415.

[157]Chubin, pp. 222-223.

[158]Interview with the Shah of Iran, unofficial text, Ramazani, The Persian Gulf, Iran's Role, pp. 144-145.

[159]Chubin, pp. 224-225.

[160]Ibid., p. 225.

[161]Ibid., pp. 226-227.

[162]R. M. Burrell and Alvin J. Cottrell, Iran, The Arabian Peninsula and the Indian Ocean (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1972), p. 17.

[163]Ibid., p. 18.

[164]Nakhleh, Arab-American Relations in the Persian Gulf, p. 40.

[165]Chubin, p. 229.

[166]Ibid.

[167]Fisher, p. 626; and Roy E. Thoman, "Iraq and the Persian Gulf Region," Current History 64 (January, 1973), p. 25.

[168]R. M. Burrell, "Policies of the Arab Littoral States in the Persian Gulf Region," Amirie, p. 246.

[169]Amirie, pp. 246-247.

[170]Anne M. Kelly, The Soviet Naval Presence During the Iraqi-Kuwaiti Border Dispute: March-April 1973, Professional Paper 122 (Arlington, Virginia: Center for Naval Analysis, 1974), pp. 3, 5.

[171]ISS, Military Balance 1973/74, p. 32.

[172]Sir Denis Wright and Elizabeth Monroe, The Changing Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf, The Report of an International Seminar at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Rome (New York: American Field University Staff, 1972), p. 60.

[173]Events, September 24/30, 1976, p. 22, and Middle East Economic Digest, September 17, 1976, p. 18.

[174]Middle East Intelligence Survey (MIS), September 16-30, 1976, pp. 94-95 and September 1-15, 1976, p. 87.

[175]Events, September 24-30, 1976, p. 23; and MIS, September 16-30, 1976, p. 95.

[176]Amirie, p. 245.

[177]John Duke Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1975), pp. 137 and 148.

[178]Ibid., p. 148.

[179]John Duke Anthony, "Insurrection and Intervention: The War in Dhofar," in Amirie, p. 296.

[180]Nakhleh, United States and Saudi Arabia, p. 52.

[181]Kelly, p. A-4; and Amirie, p. 247.

[182]Be'eri, Elizer, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 39.

[183]Haddad, pp. 63 and 72. For an excellent discussion of the personalities involved and their influence on the events of this period see Nazar Tawfik Al-Hasso, Administrative Politics in the Middle East: The Case of Monarchial Iraq, 1920-1958 (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Government, The University of Texas at Austin, 1976), pp. 213-232.

[184]Sidqi's coup was the first of its type. Its planning, organization, and execution have served as a model for many which have occurred in the Arab World since 1936. Haddad, p. 19. It should be noted though, that Sidqi's original purpose in carrying out the coup was not to replace the civilian government with military rule, but merely to put into power a civilian government which was more in line with his political views. Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 15.

[185]Haddad, p. 71.

[186]Be'eri, p. 39.

[187]Haddad, p. 80. The government routinely used police roundups, night visits, censorship, jamming of broadcasts, and the closing of schools as methods of controlling the civilian population. Joseph J. Malone, The Arab Lands of Western Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 94.

[188]Under Nuri's leadership Iraq doubled its net per capita income between 1951 and 1956, but Nuri did not make much of an effort to gain broad public support for his policies. Haddad, p. 82.

[189]Ibid., pp. 74 and 85; and Uriel Dann, Iraq Under Qassim: A Political History, 1958-1963 (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 9.

[190]Ibid., p. 19; and Khadduri, p. 20.

[191]One possible reason for the inaction of these earlier groups was the power of General Nuri al-Said's government. Nuri periodically purged the army of its dissident elements and they probably felt that power could not yet be broken. Malone, p. 93.

[192]Khadduri, pp. 22-23.

[193]Ibid., pp. 30-32.

[194]Ibid., p. 39; Be'eri, p. 178; Dann, p. 33; and J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 148. A complete listing of the revolutionary government's major appointments can be found in Dann, pp. 40-41.

[195]Hurwitz, Middle East Politics, pp. 148 and 151.

[196]Malone, p. 101.

[197]Haddad, pp. 156 and 160.

[198]Ibid., p. 163.

[199]Wright, p. 61; and Phebe A. Marr, "The Political Elite in Iraq," in George Lenczowski, ed., Political Elites in the Middle East (New York: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), p. 127.

[200]Lenczowski, Political Elites, p. 127.

[201]David Lynn Price, Oil and Middle East Security, the Washington Papers, Vol. IV, No. 41 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications), p. 22; and Malone, p. 114.

[202]The Times (London), July 3, 1973, p. 6; and New York Times, July 8, 1973, p. 1.

[203]Joseph M. Upton, The History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 44.

[204]Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), pp. 20-21.

[205]Upton, p. 52.

[206]Hurewitz, Middle East Politics, pp. 283-284.

[207]Ibid., p. 286; Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 112; and James A. Bill, "The Social and Economic Foundations of Power in Contemporary Iran," Middle East Journal XVII (Autumn 1963), pp. 411-412.

[208]Zonis, p. 112; and Hurewitz, Middle East Politics, p. 286.

[209]For example, he allows military officers to import luxury items such as automobiles and refrigerators without paying the required customs duties. Ibid.

[210]Smith, pp. 72-74. When the army suppressed the June 1963 riots in Shiraz and Tehran, they reportedly caused as many as 3000 injuries. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics, p. 292. In January 1962 Iranian commandos invaded Tehran University and ruthlessly put down student demonstrations over the issue of free elections, resulting in one student death and some 200 injuries. James Alban Bill, The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1972), p. 139.

[211]Zonis, pp. 113 and 115.

[212]Zonis, p. 54; and Cottam, p. 297.

[213]Zonis, pp. 49 and 51.

[214]See Cottam, p. 297; Upton, p. 105; Zonis, pp. 84-85; Bill pp. 42-44; and Price, pp. 44-45.

[215]One of the surest methods of incurring the displeasure of a king is to oppose him too strongly if his mind is set. In each case a significant action affecting the military was taking place at the time. Hijazi's 1966 retirement coincided roughly with the opening of negotiations for Soviet military equipment. Ariyana's retirement took place shortly after the 1969 Shatt-al-Arab crisis with Iraq. Jam's 1971 demotion occurred in the midst of the intense diplomatic activity preceeding the formation of the United Arab Emirates and Iran's occupation of Abu Musa and the two Tumbs. It is conceivable that the three generals opposed the Shah's actions, or made serious errors of judgment in military operations and were removed as a result. Zonis, pp. 22-23; and Bill, pp. 39-42.

[216]Price, pp. 44-45.

[217]Bill and Stookey, Politics and Petroleum, p. 30.

[218]Mordechai Abir, Oil, Power and Politics: Conflict in Arabia, the Red Sea and the Gulf (London: Frank Cass, 1974), p. 55; and Hurewitz, p. 215.

[219]Ibid.

[220]Ibid.

[221]SIPRI, p. 561; and Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans: A Political Survey of Instability in the Arab World (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), p. 70.

[222]Abir, pp. 53 and 58-59.

[223]Bill and Stookey, p. 31.

[224]New York Times, September 9, 1969, pp. 1 and 6.

[225]Abir, p. 54. The regime did not bring those arrested to trial until 1973, at which time they sentenced 135 to death, 305 to life imprisonment, and 752 to lesser terms. John B. Kelly, "Saudi

Arabia and the Gulf States," in A. L. Udovitch, ed., The Middle East: Oil, Conflict and Hope (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976), pp. 435-436.

[226]Abir, p. 73, n. 168. The 1972 coup was reportedly being organized by the Marxist-oriented Sons of the Arabian Peninsula organization at the time of their arrest in 1972. A number of young military officers were reported to be among those arrested. Abir, p. 54.

[227]Bill and Stookey, p. 29; and MIS, December 1, 1974, Vol. 2, No. 17, p. 135.

[228]Abir, p. 59.

[229]MIS, October 1-15, 1976, p. 103.

[230]Kayhan International, October 20, 1976, p. 2.

[231]MIS, October 1-15, 1976, p. 103.

[232]Events, September 24-30, 1976, p. 23; and MIS, September 16-30, 1976, p. 94.

[233]Burrell, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan: Tensions and Dilemmas, p. 7.

[234]Ibid., p. 10.

[235]Anthony, p. 28.

A P P E N D I X

TABLE ABBREVIATIONS

* - Degree of uncertainty
AA - Anti-aircraft
AAM - Air to air missile
AC - Armoured car
A/C - Aircraft
AF - Air force
AFV - Armoured fighting vehicle
APC - Amoured personnel carrier
AS - Air superiority
ASM - Air to surface missile
ASW - Anti-submarine warfare
ATM - Anti-tank missile
Batt - Battalion
Brig - Brigade
coin - Counterinsurgency
CR - Combat radius
Div - Division
FB - Fighter bomber
+ - More than this number
GA - Ground attack
GS - Ground support
hvy - heavy
KM - Kilometer
Lt - light
MAP - Military Aid Program
MR - Multi-role
NM - Nauticle mile
psgr - passenger
recon - Reconnaissance
SAM - Surface to air missile
SS - Supersonic
SSM - Surface to surface missile
TAC - Tactical
tk - tank
tps - troops
tpt - transport
tng - training

TABLE 1

IRANIAN ARMS ACQUISITIONS/CONTRACTS 1965-1976

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
U.S.	1964	F-5A	91	TAC FB A/C		n.a.	1965[a]
U.S.	1964	F-5B	15	TAC FB A/C, Trainer A/C	(see text)	n.a.	1965[a]
U.S.	n.a.	M-60 A1	100*	48 ton main battle tank (total in 1971, 460 units)[au]		n.a.	1965[b]
U.S.	n.a.	M-113	50*	11 ton APC		n.a.	1965[b]
U.K.	9/66	Naval Frigate	4	1200 ton fitted with 4KM Seacat SAM & Sea Killer 13 NM SSM[d,e]		70	1971-72[c,e]
U.K.	9/66	Tigercat	400*	SAM, 4KM range[f] low level, close range defense		15	1968[a,c]
U.S.	1964	Hawk	100+	SAM with maximum range- 35KM[d]		n.a.	1966[a]
U.S.	n.a.	HH 43F Huskie	16	Helo (10 PSGR or Lt Cargo)[g]		n.a.	1966-68[a]
U.S.	12/66	F-4D Phantom	30	MR F A/C 868+mile CR[h] Equipped with AAM		100	1967-68[c]
U.K.	1967	Destroyer	1	3300 ton fitted with Seacat (to be fitted with standard SAM, 1975)		n.a.	1970[e]
U.S.S.R.	2/67	Military Equipment	100*	BTR 152, 7 ton APC Trucks Lorries 57 MM and 85 MM AA Guns		110	1967-68[b,c,j,k]
U.S.	10/67	F-4	32	MR F A/C		16 @ 100 16 @ 40	1968-70[a,l]

Table 1 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
U.S.	10/67	Sidewinder	384*	AAM 10NM range[m]		n.a.	1968-70[a]
		Sparrow	384*	AAM 12NM range[m]		n.a.	1968-70[a]
Italy	1968	AB 205 Iroquois	40	14psgr, tpt helo[o] (Bell, Italian produced)		50	1969[a,n]
U.S.	12/68	UH-1D Iroquois	40	Helicopter	(see text)	n.a.	*1970-72[n]
U.K.	1967-70	BH7	2	Hovercraft (Wellington)		10	1969[b,p]
		SRN6	8	Hovercraft (Winchester)			
Italy	1969	AB 206 A Jetranger	100	4 psgr Lt helo[q]		50	1969-70[a,n]
U.S.	1967	Naval Frigate	2	1100 ton general purpose (no missles)		n.a.	1969[p]
U.S.	n.a.	Lockheed C-130	8	Hvy tpt A/C total of 26 ordered as of November, 1970[r]		n.a.	1963-70[a]
Fr.	1969	SA 321 Super Frelon	16	Hvy tpt helo, 37 psgr[s]		28	1970-71[a,n]
U.K.	n.a.	Tigercat	400*	SAM (in addition to previous order)		28	1968-69[a]
U.S.	1970	Patrol Boats	3	PGM class motor gunboats		MAP	1970[e,bn]
U.S.	Early 1970	CH-47C Chinook	4	Hvy tpt helo, 33-44 tps or complete artillery section with ammo[w]		n.a.	1971[bn]

Table 1 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
U.K.	5/70	Rapier	2 batteries	Low level, 3000+ meter SAM[u]		112.8	1972-73[t,bn]
Italy	1970	CH-47C Chinook	22	Hvy tpt helo, 33-44 tps or complete artillery section with ammo[w]		n.a.	172-76[a,t,v]
Nether-lands	12/70	F27 Friendship	12	Lt tpt A/C		n.a.	1971-72[bn]
U.S.	12/70	C-130	30	Hvy tpt A/C		122	1970[x]
U.K.	1971	Chieftain	800	52 ton main battle tank		160 - 192	1972-[x,bn]
U.K.	10/71	Seacat	n.a.	SAM (naval equivalent of Tigercat)		2.5	n.a.[y]
U.S.	1971	AR	1	Repair ship (USN transfer)		n.a.	1971[z]
U.K.	3/71	BH7 Hovercraft	2	Coastal defense and logistics duties[e] (+2 in 1974)		13.05	1973-74[y,aa]
U.S.	1971	DD-710	2	General purpose naval destroyers (USN transfer)		n.a.	1972[p]
U.S.	3/72	Tow	n.a.	Wire-guided, line of sight ATM[ab]		15	1972[y]
U.S.	4/72	F-5E	30	TAC FB A/C		n.a.	n.a.[y]
Italy	1971*	ASH-3D	10	ASW helo[ac]		n.a.	Late 1971-[v,bn]
U.K.	8/72	Scorpion	300	Lt tank armed with Swingfire ATM		72	n.a.[ad,ae,bo]

Table 1 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
U.K.	8/72	Fox	300	Armoured recon vehicle		(included in entry above)	
U.S.	1972	P-3C Orion	6	Ocean surveilance A/C		n.a.	1974[ad]
U.S.	1972	F-5E	111	TAC FB A/C		n.a.	1974-[ad]
U.S.	12/72	Bell 214 Huey Plus	326	Utility helo (original order 287)		496.8	1975-76[ae,af]
U.S.	12/72*	Bell AH-1J Huey Cobra	202	Helo gunship		367	1975-76[ae,af]
U.K.	1971-72	Ships	2	Landing (logistic) ships		n.a.	1973-74[z]
Fr	n.a.	SS-11	n.a.	Line of sight, wire-guided 500-3000 meter battlefield missile[ag]		n.a.	1972[v]
Fr	n.a.	SS-12	n.a.	SSM - 6000 meter battlefield support missile[ah]		n.a.	1972[v]
U.S.	1972	F-4	70	MR FB A/C		n.a.	1974[ae]
U.S.	1972	Boeing 707-320	6	Tanker A/C refuels F-4, F-5, F-14		62.5	n.a.[ae]
U.K.	1972	BH7 Mk 5 Hovercraft	4	Space allocated for SSM - not installed		n.a.	1974-75[z]
U.S.	1972	C-130	20	Hvy tpt A/C		n.a.	1974-75[ad]

Table 1 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
Ger	1971-72	Fleet Supply Ships	3	Tanker/general stores ships		n.a.	1974-75[z]
U.K.	1973-74	Blindfire	n.a.	AA radar for use with Rapier SAM		14.4	n.a.[ai]
U.S.	n.a.	Artillery	n.a.	155mm, 175mm self propelled, and 203mm howitzer		n.a.	1973-74[aj]
U.S.	n.a.	RT 33	6	Recon A/C		n.a.	1973[aj]
U.K.	n.a.	Scorpion	250	Lt tank		n.a.	n.a.[ak]
Italy	1974	CH-47C Chinook	22	Hvy tpt helo		100	1975-[ak,ai]
Fr	2/74 and 6/74	Combattante Class PTF	6 6	Fast patrol boats with Exocet SSM		n.a.	n.a.[z,ai]
U.S.	1/74 and 6/74	F-14 Tomcat	30 50	AS A/C with Pheonix Missile		30 @ 845 50 @ 1100	1976-[af,al]
U.S.	1/74 and 6/74	Phoenix	424	68+ NM range AAM for use with F-14[ab] - costs included in F-14 price			1976-[af]
U.S.	n.a.	Dragon	634	Shoulder fired ATM[ay]		n.a.	not delivered as of 9/76[af]
U.S.	n.a.	Tow	6700	Wire-guided line of sight ATM[ab] total order to 8/76		n.a.	1972-[af]

Table 1 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
U.S.	1974	Maverick	2850 (2500)[ai]	TV-guided ASM carried by F-4[ab]		50	n.a.[ae,ai]
U.S.	2/74	RGM 84A Harpoon	222	Naval SSM, to be fitted on hovercraft		n.a.	1976-[am]
U.S.	2/74	Coronet Ruby	1	Electronic warfare training range		n.a.	n.a.[an]
U.S.	3/74	Laser-guided bombs	n.a.	Six F-4s to be equipped		n.a.	n.a.[ao]
U.S.	4/74 and 8/74	DD 963	6(4) (reduced - 1976)[bp]	Spruance class destroyers with Sea Sparrow SAM[1]		660 (2,000 - 1976)[bp]	1980-[ap,bp]
U.S.	4/74	HAWK	6 batteries	SAM - improved missile, command and long range radar (1976 total 37 batteries)[bq]		n.a.	n.a.[af]
U.S.	10/74	F-4E	36	MR F A/C		150	1976[ap,aq]
U.S.	Late 1974	KC-135	6	Tanker A/C, refuels F-4, F-5, F-14		130	1976[ap]
Ger	1974*	F28 Fellowship	4	Short haul 79 psgr jet tpt A/C[ar]		n.a.	1976-[aj,ap]
U.S.	n.a.	RF-5	18	Recon version of F-5[at]		n.a.	1974[as]

Table 1 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
U.S.	1974*	RF-4E	1 squadron (16 units)[aw]	Recon version of F-4[av]		n.a.	1976-[au]
U.S.	12/74	Tank TNG Complex	1	Chieftain tank training complex		122	1976-[bt]
U.S.	1974*	F-5-E	38	TAC FB A/C		n.a.	1976[ax]
U.S.	1/75	Submarines	3	Tang class diesel powered		n.a.	1977-79[ap,bp]
U.S.	4/75	Boeing 747B	9	Military transport with side cargo doors		n.a.	1976-77[az]
U.S.	n.a.	F-5F	28	Advanced TAC FB A/C to replace F-5A/Bs		102	1976-[af]
U.S.	3/75	IBEX	1	Ground-based communications and radar monitoring system		n.a.	n.a.[ba]
U.K.	5/75	Chieftain	1200	Main battle tanks		n.a.	n.a.[ap]
U.S.	5/75	COMINT	1	Communications intelligence system		500	n.a.[ap]
U.S.	11/75	ELINT	1	Electronic intelligence network		n.a.	n.a.[ba]
U.S.	1975	C-130E	26	Extended range hvy tpt A/C[bb]		n.a.	n.a.[bm]
U.S.	1975	C-130H	30	C-130E with more powerful engines[bb]		n.a.	n.a.[bm]

Table 1 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
U.S.	1975	F-4	190*	MR F A/C (the 10/74 order of 36 units believed to be included in this total)		n.a.	n.a.[bm]
U.S.	1976	RH-53D	6	Minesweeping helo		n.a.	1976-77[af]
U.K.	8/76	Rapier	several batteries	Mounted on tracked vehicle			
U.K.	8/76	Chieftain	300 (added to above 1200)	Main battle tank with new high strength armour (order change - 1500)		537	n.a.[bc]
U.K.	8/76	Scorpion	110	Lt tanks (These last three contracts are being bartered directly for oil)			
U.S.	1976	E-3A	2-6	Advanced warning and control system A/C			
U.S.	1976	E-2C	4-10	Early warning A/C	Under negotiation for possible barter arrangement with oil	n.a.[bd]	
U.S.	1976	Boeing 747	n.a.	Military tpt A/C			
U.S.	1976	HH-53	12	Long range search and rescue or very hvy lift helo			
U.S.	n.a.	F-18	250[bf]	F-4 replacement (negotiations and cost estimate originally included F-16s but F-16 contract concluded separately)	Under negotiation for possible barter arrangement with oil	3800	1980's[be,bf]

Table 1 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
U.S.	2/76	F-15	51	Advanced AS F A/C[bh]		79.2	n.a.[bg]
U.S.	1976	A-10	40	Advanced GA A/C	In negotiation		n.a.[bi]
U.S.	6/76	Peace Log	1	Air force logistics network		150 (annually)	n.a.[bj]
U.S.	1976	Seek Century	1	Ground-based radar and air defense system	In competitive source selection		n.a.[bk]
U.S.	n.a.	Standard	n.a.	35NM range SAM (naval), to be fitted onto DD-710		n.a.	1976-[bl]
U.S.	10/76	F-16	160	Lightweight F A/C		974.4 (estimate)	1980-84[br]
U.S.	1/77	Air Maintenance	n.a.	Air maintenance site - includes 9 repair facilities		undetermined 3/8/77	n.a.[bs]

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al. AWST, June 17, 1974, p. 14; and January 14, 1974, p. 15.

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bd. AWST, May 17, 1976, p. 14 and August 9, 1976, p. 22.

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TABLE 2

IRAQI ARMS ACQUISITIONS/CONTRACTS 1962-1976

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
U.S.S.R	1962*	TU-16 Badger-A	10	Jet bomber A/C-3000 mi. range[b] 19,800 lb. bomb load		n.a.[c]	1962[a]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	P-6	12	Motor torpedo boat, 50 ton		n.a.	1959-61[a]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	BTR-152	200	7 ton APC		n.a.	1960-64[a]
U.S.S.R.	1962*	MI-1 helo	2	First Soviet military helo[d]		n.a.	1962*[a]
U.S.S.R.	1962*	AN-12	8	Military cargo A/C Medium lift		n.a.	1962-65*[a]
U.S.S.R.	1962*	Corvette	3	Submarine chasers-220 ton Soviet Naval vessels transferred[f]		n.a.	1962[a]
U.K.	n.a.	Hawker hunter T.66/T.69	6/3	Trainer for Hawker fighter		n.a.	1963[a]
U.K.	n.a.	Saracen	100*	11 ton APC		n.a.	1963[a]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	MIG 21 Fishbed	12	F A/C		n.a.	1964[a]
U.K.	1964	Hunter FGA 9	27	F, GA A/C		n.a.	1963-64[a]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	MI-4 helo	9	Carries[h] 14 tps or 3525 lbs. freight		n.a.	1964*[a]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	Atoll	192*	AAM for use with MIG 21		n.a.	1963-66[a]

Table 2 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	SA-2 Guideline	30	SAM 25-30 mi. range[i] 5 launching sites		n.a.	1963-65[a]
U.K.	n.a.	Hawker hunter F-10	4	F A/C		n.a.	1964[a]
U.K.	n.a.	Wessex Helo	12	15-16 psgr helo[j]		n.a.	1964[a]
U.K.	n.a.	Hawker Hunter F59	19	F A/C		n.a.	1964-66[a]
U.K.	n.a.	Jet Provost T 52	20	Light strike A/C[k]		n.a.	1965-66[a]
U.S.S.R.	8/66	MIG 21 Fishbed	50*	F A/C		n.a.	1966-67[a,l]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	MIG 17/19	15*	F A/C (MIG-19 is SS A/C)[m]		n.a.	1967[a]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	SU-7 Fitter	20	Tactical FB A/C (see text)		n.a.	1967[a]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	T-34	50	Tank		n.a.	1966-67[n]
Fr.	n.a.	AML 60	n.a.	4.8 ton AC		n.a.	1967-68[o]
Fr.	1968	Nortales	8	Tpt A/C		n.a.	*[a]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	T-54	50*	Main battle tank, 36 ton		n.a.	1968[a]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	TU-16 Badger	2	Medium Jet bombers		n.a.	1967-68[o]

Table 2 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	MIG 21 Fishbed	10	F A/C		n.a.	1967-68[o]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	MIG 17 & MIG 19	12	F A/C		n.a.	1967-68[o]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	SU-7	20	Ground attack		n.a.	1968-69[a]
Fr.	2/68	AMX 30	70	Main battle tank, 36 ton		150	*1970[a,p]
Fr.	4/68	Mirage V	52	Strike F A/C (see text)			*1970[p]
Fr.	1968	Alouette III	12	Weapons carrying helo[q]		n.a.	1973[a]
Fr.	1970	AML 90		Armored Car, 5.5 ton		n.a.	1970[a,r]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	T54/T55	150	Main Battle tanks, 36 ton		n.a.	1969-70s
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	T54/T55	350	Main Battle tanks, 36 ton		n.a.	1970-71[t]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	PT 76	45	Light tank, 16 ton		n.a.	1970-71[t]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	TU 16 Badger	1	Medium jet bomber		n.a.	1970-71[t]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	MIG 21 Fishbed	25	F A/C		n.a.	1970-71[t]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	MI-4	15	Military helo		n.a.	1970-71[t]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	MI-8	12	Tpt helo		n.a.	1970-71[t]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	T54/T55	100	Main battle tanks, 36 ton		n.a.	1972-73[u]

Table 2 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	T34	30	Main battle tanks, 32 ton		n.a.	1972-73[u]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	BTR-152	300	7 ton APC		n.a.	1972-73[u]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	Artillery AA Guns	400	75mm, 85mm, 100mm, 120mm, 130mm and 152mm guns; 23mm, 37mm, 57mm, 85mm and 100mm AA guns		n.a.	1972-73[u]
U.S.S.R.	4/72	OSA	3	Fast patrol boats armed with Styx 26 NM range, SSM[w]		n.a.	10/72[u,v]
U.S.S.R.	4/72	SU-7	12	FB A/C		n.a.	Spring, '73[x,y]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	MIG 21	10	F A/C		n.a.	1972-73[u,x]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	MI-8	17	Military tpt helo		n.a.	1972-73[u]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	SA-3 GOA	n.a.	SAM 17 mi. range		n.a.	1972-73[u]
U.S.S.R.	10/73	MIG 21	n.a.	F A/C		n.a.	1973-74[x]
U.S.S.R.	10/73	SU-7	n.a.	FB A/C		n.a.	1973-74[x]
Czech.	Spring, '73	L-29, L-39z	n.a.	Coin/Strike A/C	Part of deal valued at 75		1973---[x,y]
U.S.S.R.	1973	MIG 23 (Flogger)	40	MR variable geometry wing MACH 2 AS A/C		n.a.	Late 1974[z]
U.S.S.R.	4/73	MI-6	n.a.	Helo		n.a.	Spring, '73[y]
Fr.	1974	Alouette III	40	Weapons carrying helo		n.a.	n.a.[z]

Table 2 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
Fr.	1974	SS-11	n.a.	ATM to fit Allouette III		18.8	n.a.[ah]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	TU-22	12*	Long range medium bomber (see text)		n.a.	1973[ab]
U.S.S.R.	10/74	MIG 23 (Flogger)	12	FB (Being flown by Russian pilots)[ad]		n.a.	1974[ac]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	SA-3 GOA	n.a.	17 mi. SAM[w]		n.a.	1973[ae]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	SA-6 Gainful	n.a.	Mobile SAM		n.a.	1974-75[ae]
U.S.S.R	n.a.	FROG	n.a.	SSM, 4-40 NM range[af]		n.a.	1974-75[ae]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	SA-7	n.a.	6 mi. shoulder launched SAM[w]		n.a.	1974-75[ae]
U.S.	Late 1974	Boeing 707/737	3/2	Tpt A/C		n.a.	1975-76[ag]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	AFV	n.a.	Armored fighting vehicle		n.a.	1/75[z]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	OSA	5	Fast patrol boat with Styx SSM		n.a.	1/75[z]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	P-6	n.a.	Motor torpedo boat		n.a.	1/75[z]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	SCUD	n.a.	Battlefield SSM, medium range (reportedly to be handled by soviets)		n.a.	2/75[ae,ah]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	MIG 23 (Flogger)	18*	FB (total of two squadrons)		n.a.	1974-75[ae]
U.S.S.R.	n.a.	T-62	400	Main battle tank		n.a.	1974-75[ai]

Table 2 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
U.S.S.R.	8.76	MIG 23	100	FB A/C (see text)		8/76 contract total: 3,000	1977-80[aj]
U.S.S.R.	8/76	MIG 25 Foxbat	Wing (exact no. of A/C unk)	MACH 3.2 MOst advanced Soviet F A/C[al] (piloted by Soviets)(See text)		"	1977-80[aj]
U.S.S.R.	8/76	Frigates	at least 10	Advanced missle carrying ships (see text)		"	1977-80[aj]
U.S.S.R.	8/76	SA-6	25	SAM (see text)		"	1977-80[aj]
U.S.S.R.	8/76	T-62/T-64	Several Hundred	Main battle tanks (see text)		"	1977-80[aj]
U.S.S.R.	8/76	SCUD/ Scalebird	12 batteries	SSM (see text)		"	1977-80[aj]
U.S.S.R.	8/76	Artillery	Several Hundred Guns	155mm, 203mm and others (see text)		"	1977-80[aj]
U.S.S.R.	8/76	APCs	Several Hundred	Type unknown (see text)		"	1977-80[aj]
Fr.	n.a.	Mirage F1	60-80	Advanced jet fighter		In negotiation	n.a.[am]

a. SIPRI, The Arms Trade, pp. 842-843.

b. Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 457.

c. Cost information is generally unavailable due to the secrecy of the agreement with the supplying government.

d. Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 446.

e. Ibid, p. 428.

f. Jane's Fighting Ships 1975-76, p. 183.

g. Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 443.

h. Ibid., p. 447.

i. AWST, March 11, 1974, p. 135.

j. Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 237.

k. Jane's Aircraft 1964-65, p. 122.

l. ISS, The Military Balance 1967/68, p. 53.

m. Jane's Aircraft 1962-63, p. 297.

n. Comparison of SIPRI, Arms Trade, p. 843; and Jon D. Glassman, Arms For The Arabs (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 116.

o. Comparison of Military Balance 1967/68, p. 39; and 1968/69, p.44.

p. ISS, The Military Balance 1968/69, p. 58.

q. Jane's Aircraft 1970-71, p. 73.

r. SIPRI Yearbook, 1972, p. 126.

s. Comparison of Military Balance 1969/70, p. 34; and 1970/71, p. 40.

t. Comparison of Military Balance 1970/71, p. 40; and 1971/72, p. 28.

u. Comparison of Military Balance 1972/73, p. 31; and 1973/74, pp. 32-33.

v. SIPRI Yearbook, 1973, p. 326.

w. AWST, March 11, 1974, p. 135.

x. ISS, The Military Balance 1974/75, p. 89.

y. SIPRI Yearbook, 1974, p. 268.

z. ISS, The Military Balance 1975/76, p. 90.

aa. Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, pp. 444-445.

ab. Duprey, Almanac of World Military Power, 1974, p. 182; and New York Times, October 3, 1973, p. 10.

ac. Washington Post, October 5, 1974, p. A1; and September 12, 1974, p. A25.

ad. Washington Post, October 5, 1974, p. A1.

ae. ISS, The Military Balance 1975/76, p. 34.

af. Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 572.

ag. AWST, April 28, 1975, p. 26; and December 16, 1974, p. 12.

ah. Washington Post, February 1, 1975, p. A1.

ai. Comparison of Military Balance 1973/74, p. 32; 1974/75, p. 34.

aj. Kayhan International, October 20, 1976, p. 3.

ak. SIPRI Yearbook, 1975, p. 224.

al. Jane's Aircraft, 1975-76, p. 501.

am. Middle East Economic Digest, 17 September 1976, p. 13.

TABLE 3

SAUDI ARABIAN ARMS ACQUISITIONS/CONTRACTS 1965-1976

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
U.K.	9/65	Lightning	40	Mach 2+ interceptor A/C + AAM[c]		154[b]	1968-69[a]
U.K.	9/65	Jet Provosts	25	Lt. Strike A/C			1968-69[a]
U.K.	n.a.	Radar System	1	Extremely advanced		70	n.a.[b]
U.K.	n.a.	Training	--	For all of above		81.2	n.a.[e]
U.S.	9/65	Hawk	150*	SAM, 35 KM range[e]		57	1966[a]
U.S.	n.a.	C-130E Hercules	4[a] (initially)	Hvy Tpt A/C (total to 1976-21)		300 (est. total to 1977)	1965-76[f]
U.K.	n.a.	Hawker Hunters T.66 F.6	2 4	Trainer A/C and F A/C (GA role)		n.a.	1965[a]
U.K.	n.a.	Hawker Hunter MK.9	6	F, GA, GS, A/C[be] Part of Operation Magic Carpet (OMC)		n.a.	1966[a]
U.K.	10/66	Lightning	5	Ex-RAF A/C (OMC)		n.a.	1966[g]
U.K.	10/66	Thunderbird I	37	SAM, 35 KM range[g] (OMC)		20	1966[a,h]
U.S.	1966*	Saudi ordinance corps program	4200	Tactical/gen. purpose vehicles, limited small arms, maintenance and modern logistics system		415	1966-76[f]
U.S.	n.a.	Cessna 310	11	Small admin. and cargo A/C[d]		n.a.	1967[a]

Table 3 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
Italy	n.a.	AB 205 AB 206	24	Tpt helo 14 psgr[j] Lt. helo 4 psgr[j]		n.a.	1967-69[a,i,k]
Fr.	n.a.	AMX-13	n.a.	15 ton Lt tk		n.a.	1967-68[i]
U.S.	n.a.	M-41	n.a.	25.4 ton Lt tk		n.a.	1967-68[i]
U.S.	n.a.	C-118	2	Medium tpt A/C		n.a.	1967-68[i]
Fr.	Spring '68[m]	AML-90	200-226	5.5 ton AC		96	1969-70[a,l]
U.K.	1/68	Patrol boat	22	Coastal defense		100	1971[l,n]
U.S.	n.a.	C-140 Jet Star	2	Medium cargo/tpt A/C[k]		n.a.	1969[a]
Fr.	1969	Alouette III	6[o]	Weapons carrying helo		n.a.	1970*[a]
U.K.	n.a.	BAC 167 Strikemaster	25	Coin/Lt strike jet A/C[p]		n.a.	1969-70[a]
U.K.	1969	SNR-6 Hovercraft	8	Coastal Patrol		12	1970-71[q,r]
Ger.	1969	Jaguar-PTF	3	Fast attack torpedo boats		n.a.	1970-71[r,s]
U.S.	n.a.	C-123	6	Medium tpt A/C		n.a.	1969-70[j]
U.K.	1971	Vigilant	n.a.	Lt weight ATM 4500 ft range[v]		n.a.	n.a.[u]
U.S.	10/71	F-5A/B	50	TAC FB, interceptor A/C		130	172-73[u]

Table 3 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
U.S.	1/72	Naval Expansion Program Training and Equipment as follows:					1972-81[f,w,x]
		PCG	4	245 ft., harpoon SSM equipped, patrol chaser			
		PGG	9	190 ft., harpoon SSM equipped, patrol gunboat			
		MSC	4	Coastal Mine Sweeper			
		LCU	2	Utility Landing Craft		Total Cost:	
		LCM	4	Small Landing Craft		1097[1]	
		YTB	2	Large Harbor Tugboat			
Fr.	1972	AMX-30	30	Medium tank		n.a.	1973-74[y]
U.S.	8/72	C-130	4	Tpt A/C (included in 1976 total of 21 A/C)		n.a.	n.a.[y]
U.K.	12/72	BAC-167 Strikemaster	10	Coin Lt strike A/C		n.a.	n.a.[y]
U.S.	1/73	F-5A/B	90	F, interceptor A/C		230	n.a.[y,bd]
U.S.	5/73	F-4	30	FB A/C		n.a.	n.a.[y,bd]
U.K.	8/73	Scorpion	250	Lt tk		16.3	n.a.[z]
U.K.	8/73	Fox	n.a.	AFV			
U.S.	1973	Hawk	n.a.	SAM (improved MIM 23B)		265	1974-79[z]
U.S.	Fall, '73	F-5E	30	Advanced interceptor FB A/C modified to carry Maverick ASM and French AAM[ab]		n.a.	1974[z,aa]
U.S.	Fall, '73	F-5B	20	Interceptor FB A/C		n.a.	1974[z,aa]

Table 3 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
U.S.	1973	National Guard modernization		Mechanization of infantry battalions with supporting artillery, training, and maintenance		275	1973-78[ac]
Fr.	9/73	Mirage IIIE	38	Mach 2+ interceptor, GS A/C[ad] (4 trainers),[z] reportedly for Egypt		n.a.	*1975-[z,ag]
U.S.	5/74	F-5E	70	Interceptor equipped to near F-4 capability for ground attack		n.a.	1977[z]
U.K.	1974	SH-3D Sea King	6	ASW helo, reportedly for Egypt		n.a.	n.a.[ae,af]
Fr.	12/74	AMX-30	250 (150)[w]	Medium tank			
Fr.	12/74	Armored Car	250	Machine gun carriers included in total			
Fr.	12/74	Alouette III	8	Helicopter + ATM (Hot)		825 (860)[w]	n.a.[aa,ah]
Fr.	12/74	Crotale	n.a.	4.5 NM SAM[ai] (integrated with radar and 38mm SP AA guns)[w]			
U.K.	1974	Rapier	n.a.	Low level 3000 meter SAM[aj]		108.1	n.a.[w]
Pakistan	1974	Warships	8	Unknown type, being built in Karachi		145	n.a.[aa]
Fr.	12/74	AMX-10	250	Light tank		n.a.	1975-79[aa]

Table 3 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
U.S.	12/74	TOW	n.a.	ATW			
U.S.	12/74	M-60A1	n.a.	Medium tank			
U.S.	12/74	Hawk	n.a.	SAM (improved MIM 23B)		335	n.a.[w,aa]
U.S.	12/74	Artillery	n.a.	Howitzer			
U.S.	12/74	APC	250	Armored Personnel carriers			
U.S.	1974*	C-130H KC-130H	10 2	Tpt A/C Tanker version of C-130 Hercules for airborne refueling[ak]		n.a.	1974[aa]
U.S.	12/74 (Letter of offer)	AH-1J helo	200	Helo gunship[al] (U.S. will provide 440 helos 1978-84)		n.a.	1978-84[aa]
U.S.	1/75	F-5E F-5F	40 20	Equipped to carry Maverick and Laser Guided Weapons		750	n.a.[am]
Fr.	n.a.	SS-11	n.a.	Line of sight wire guided 500-3000 meter battlefield missile[ao]		n.a.	1975[an]
Fr.	n.a.	Harpon	n.a.	ATW-same characteristics as SS-11 with automatic guidance[ap]		n.a.	1975[an]
Italy	Mid. '75	AA guns	n.a.	Type unknown		195.6	n.a.[w]
Fr.	6/75	R 550 Magic	n.a.	3.5 NM AAM to equip F-5E		n.a.	n.a.[am]
U.K.	1975-76	SH-3D Commando	32	Tp tpt helo (24 psgr) for transfer to Egypt		n.a.	n.a.[af,aq]

Table 3 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
Ger.	9/75	Marder	300	Half-track, AFV		n.a.	n.a.[ar]
U.S.	12/75	Peace Hawk V	--	Air Force modernization; training, maintenance facilities and equipment to support F-5s[aim]		1800	n.a.[as]
U.S.	3/76	Maverick	1000	ASM		47	n.a.[at]
U.S.	n.a.	Dragon	n.a.	Battlefield support missle		26.1	n.a.[au]
U.S.	n.a.	Vulcan	100	AA gun, reportedly for Jordan		40.7	n.a.[au,av]
U.S.	6/76	Air Defense	--	Air traffic control system which will tie together air defense systems		625	n.a.[aw]
U.S.	6/76	Hawk	16 batteries	MIM 23B improved Hawk		n.a.	n.a.[ax]
U.S.	9/76	F-5	110	Equipped to carry Maverick, Sidewinder, and Laser guided weapons		n.a.	n.a.[ay]
U.S.	9/76	Harpoon	117	SSM (Naval)		n.a.	1979-[az]
U.S.	10/76	Maverick	650	ATM (original contract 2500, but reduced by congress)			
U.S.	10/76	Sidewinder AIM-9J	850	AAM (original contract 1900, but reduced by congress)		750	n.a.[ba]
U.S.	10/76	TOW	1000	ATM, wire guided (original contract 1800, but reduced by congress)			

Table 3 (continued)

Supplier	Date of Acq. Agreement	System	Approx. Number	Intended Role/Mission	Remarks	Cost ($M)	Date of Delivery
U.S.	n.a.	F-16	n.a.	Lightweight Fighter	Currently interested-in negotiation	n.a.[bb]	
U.S.	n.a.	V-150	n.a.	Armored Car			
U.S.	n.a.	P-3C	6 to 8	Ocean surveilance A/C	Negotiating	n.a.[bc]	

a. SIPRI, The Arms Trade, pp. 848-849.

b. Ibid., p. 563.

c. Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 182.

d. Ibid., p. 282.

e. Ibid., p. 562.

f. U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, Committee on International Relations, Military Sales to Saudi Arabia--1975, Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1976, pp. 5 and 41.

g. SIPRI, The Arms Trade, p. 564.

h. ISS, The Military Balance 1967/68, p. 53.

i. Comparison of Military Balance 1967/68, p. 40 and 1968/69, p. 45.

j. Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, pp. 121-122.

k. Ibid., p. 339.

l. ISS, The Military Balance 1968/69, p. 58.

m. SIPRI, The Arms Trade, p. 564.

n. SIPRI Yearbook, 1972, p. 128.

o. ISS, The Military Balance 1969/70, p. 60.

p. Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 181.

q. ISS, The Military Balance 1970/71, p. 117.

r. ISS, The Military Balance 1971/72, p. 31.

s. Jane's Fighting Ships 1976-76, p. 181.

t. Comparison of Military Balance 1969/70, p. 36 and 1970/71, p. 43.

u. ISS, The Military Balance 1972/73, p. 77.

v. Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 541.

w. ISS, The Military Balance 1976/76, p. 91.

x. U.S. Department of the Navy, Royal Saudi Naval Forces Expansion Program, Promotional brochure, undated, and personal interview with U.S. Naval officer assigned to Saudi Naval Expansion Program, October 10, 1976.

y. ISS, The Military Balance 1973/74, p. 83.

z. ISS, The Military Balance 1974/75, p. 90.

aa. SIPRI Yearbook, 1975, pp. 228-229.

ab. AWST, May 5, 1975, p. 13.

ac. Washington Post, April 6, 1974, p. A1; and Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, p. 41.

ad. Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 53.

ae. AWST, March 11, 1974, p. 116.

af. SIPRI Yearbook, 1974, p. 271.

ag. AWST, October 8, 1973, p. 13; and January 14, 1974, p. 18.

ah. Washington Post, December 5, 1974, p. A19.

ai. Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 532.

aj. Ibid., p. 543.

ak. Ibid., p. 336.

al. Ibid., p. 248.

am. AWST, January 13, 1975, p. 16; June 2, 1975, p. 95; and New York Times, January 2, 1975, p. 8.

an. Comparison of Military Balance 1974/75, p. 37; and 1975/76, p. 37.

ao. Jane's Aircraft 1971-72, p. 527.

ap. Ibid., p. 528.

aq. AWST, March 15, 1975, p. 13.

ar. Dr. Mordechai Abir, "The Impact of Recent Western Arms Sales to the Gulf States," U.S. Congress, House, Special Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on International Relations, The Persian Gulf, 1975: The Continuing Debate on Arms Sales, Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1976, p. 257.

as. AWST, June 21, 1976, p. 18; and New York Times, March 11, 1976, p. 59.

at. AWST, October 4, 1976, p. 17; and March 9, 1976, p. 19.

au. AWST, March 9, 1976, p. 19.

av. AWST, August 9, 1976, p. 24.

aw. AWST, June 7, 1976, p. 22.

ax. New York Times, June 15, 1976, p. 53.

ay. AWST, September 6, 1976, p. 45.

az. AWST, September 27, 1976, p. 16.

ba. AWST, October 4, 1976, p. 17.

bb. New York Times, April 19, 1976, p. 3.

bc. AWST, February 18, 1975, p. 20.

bd. AWST, January 13, 1975, p. 16; and November 12, 1973, p. 14.

be. Jane's Aircraft, 1964-65, p. 152.

TABLE 4

BALANCE OF MAJOR PERSIAN GULF MILITARY FORCES--1976

	Iran	Iraq	Saudi Arabia
ARMY			
Personnel:	175,000[a]	120,000[c]	40,000[e]
Reserves:	300,000[a]	250,000[c]	0[e]
Organization:	3 Armoured Divs[a] 4 Infantry Divs[a] 1 Airborne Brig[a] 1 Special Forces Brig[a] 1 SAM Batt[a] Army Aviation Command[a]	3 Armoured Divs[c] 4 Infantry Divs[c] 1 Republican Guard-Mechanized Brig[c] 1 Special Forces Brig[c]	1 Armoured Brig[e] 4 Infantry Brig[e] 1 Parachute Batt[e] 1 Royal Guard Batt[e] 4 Mechanized Brigs, 1 Tank Batt, 1 Airborne Brig, 2 Assault Helo Batts, 1 Attack Helo Batt, 2 Air Cavalry Batts on order[f]
Tanks:	1160[a] (1930 on order)[a]	1290[c] (hundreds on order)[d]	235[e] (500 on order)[e]
AIR FORCE			
Personnel:	60,000[a]	12,000[c]	5500[e]
Combat Aircraft:	238[a] (465 on order)[a]	247[c] (110+ on order)[d]	95[e] (138 on order)[e]

Table 4 (continued)

	Iran	Iraq	Saudi Arabia
NAVY			
Personnel:	15,000[a]	3,000[c]	1,500[e]
Combat Ships:	20 (Destroyers, Frigates, and Submarines)[b]	10 Missile Carrying Frigates (on order)[d]	0[e]
SSM equipped Patrol Boats:	18[a]	8[c]	13 (on order)[e]
PARA-MILITARY	70,000 Gendarmerie[c]	10,000 National Guard[c] 4,800 Security Troops[c] 4,000-5,000 Others[c]	16,000 National Guard[e] 6,500 Frontier Force[e]

a. ISS, The Military Balance 1975/76, p. 33.

b. Jane's Fighting Ships 1975/76, p. 179.

c. ISS, The Military Balance 1975/76, p. 34.

d. Kayhan International, October 20, 1976, p. 3.

e. ISS, The Military Balance 1975/76, p. 37.

f. Washington Post, November 7, 1974, p. A26.

TABLE 5

RELATIVE CAPABILITIES OF MAJOR AIRCRAFT

IN THE PERSIAN GULF

U.S.	
F-86	Korean War era subsonic jet fighter, armed with six 12.7 mm guns and can carry bombs or air-to-ground rockets.[a] Roughly equivalent to Soviet MIG-17.
F-5	Lightweight tactical fighter designed and built by Northrup Corporation for export to U.S. allies. Designed for relatively simple maintenance, but is capable of various combat roles including reconnaissance. Mach 1.4 speed, carries 20 mm cannon, Sidewinder AAM, and/or a bomb, rocket or ASM load up to a maximum load of 6200 lbs.[b] Capabilities roughly equivalent to MIG-21.
F-4	Mach 2+ two-seat, long range, all-weather interceptor and attack bomber. Designed as front line U.S. fighter. Carries six AAM and/or alternative loads of bombs, rockets, or ASMs to a maximum combat load of 16,000 lbs.[c] Key to effectiveness is the man in the second seat who operates the installed target acquisition radars, associated fire-control computers and the armament.[d] Capabilities roughly equivalent to MIG-23.
F-14	Mach 2+, two-seat, multi-role variable-geometry wing aircraft. Designed for air-to-air combat superiority and broad area air defense. Armed with multi-barrel 20 mm cannon, Pheonix/Sparrow/Sidewinder AAM, and various combinations of bombs/missiles to a maximum external load of 14,500 lbs. Aircraft has a unique capability to engage several targets over a wide area at the same time.[e] As

Table 5 (continued)

	with F-4, the key to its effectiveness is the man in the second seat who performs the same functions as in the F-4.[d] No currently known Soviet equivalent in capability, due to target engagability factor.
F-15	Mach 2.5+, air superiority, single-seat, long-range fighter aircraft. Possesses secondary, but effective, air-to-ground mission. Armament includes 20mm multi-barrel cannon, variety of short and medium range AAM (Sidewinder/Sparrow) and maximum external bomb/rocket/missile load of 15,000 lbs.[i] Capabilities roughly equivalent to MIG-25; however, MIG-25's speed advantage is significant.
F-16	Mach 2+, single-seat, lightweight/air-combat fighter. To become major NATO fighter by replacing older F-104's. Armament includes 20mm multi-barrel cannon, Sidewinder AAM, and bombs/rockets/ASM's up to a maximum load of 11,000 to 15,200 lbs., depending upon fuel load.[g] Soviet equivalent unknown.
F-18	Mach 1.8+, low-cost, lightweight, multi-mission, single-seat, aircraft designed to replace the F-4 on missions of fighter escort and interdiction. Armament includes 20mm multi-barrel cannon, Sidewinder/Sparrow AAM, and mixed external ordnance to a maximum load in excess of 13,000 lbs.[h] Soviet equivalent unknown.
A-10	Subsonic, advanced close-support aircraft. Designed to provide maximum air support for ground forces. Armament includes 30mm seven barrel cannon, and maximum external bomb/rocket/ASM load of 16,000 lbs.[l] Soviet equivalent unknown.

Table 5 (continued)

U.S.S.R.	
MIG-17	Korean War era, subsonic jet fighter. Armament includes 23mm/37mm cannons, air-to-air rockets and bombs.[j] Roughly equivalent to F-86.
MIG-19	Mach 1.4, mid-1950's jet fighter. Armament includes 23mm/37mm cannons, AAM and air-to-ground rockets.[k] Roughly equivalent to U.S. F-100.
MIG-21	Mach 2, single-seat, short range jet fighter. Armament includes 30mm cannon and AAM.[l] Later versions increased armament to improve air-to-ground capability. Roughly equivalent to F-5 and F-104.
TU-16	Subsonic, long range heavy bomber. Armament consists of six or seven separate 20mm gun stations. Maximum bomb load 19,800 lbs.[m] Roughly equivalent to B-52.
SU-7	Mach 1.6, single-seat, ground-attack fighter. Armament includes 30mm cannon, and external bombs/rockets, normally totaling 25000 lbs.[n] Rough U.S. equivalent unknown.
MIG-23	Mach 2.3, single-seat, variable-geometry wing tactical fighter. A two-seat combat version is in use. Armament includes a twin barrel 23mm cannon, AAM and external weapons of unknown type. Roughly equivalent to F-4.
TU-22	Mach 1.4 long-range bomber. Weapons load believed to be less than TU-16.[p] Roughly equivalent to U.S. B-58.
MIG-25	Mach 3.2, medium range, single-seat fighter. Due to altitude capability (80,000 ft.), also used in reconnaisance role. Known to carry advanced AAM, however, other armament unknown.[q] Roughly equivalent to F-15, however, speed advantage is significant. F-14 with Phoenix missile considered to be effective opponet of MIG-25.

Table 5 (continued)

U.K.	
Jet Provost	Subsonic, medium range, light, two-seat airplane. Designed as jet fighter; however, has primary ground attack role. Armament includes .303 inch machine gun and external loads of .50 inch guns, rockets, bombs in small amounts.[r]
BAC 145	Basically an improved Jet Provost aircraft with a counterinsurgency role in later models. Armament load capacity increased.[r]
Hawker Hunter	Subsonic, long-range, single-seat gound attack jet fighter. MK 66 is a two-seat version. Armament includes 30mm Aden guns and 7,000+ lbs. of external ordinance including bombs and rockets.[s]
Lightning	Mach 2+, single-seat, all weather interceptor. Armament includes 30mm Aden guns, AAM and air-to-air rockets.[t] Roughly equivalent to F-5 in capability.
FRANCE	
Mirage III	Mach 2+, high altitude, single-seat, all weather interceptor with a secondary ground support role. Armament includes 30mm cannon and AAM. Ground attack armament includes two 1000 lb. bombs or rockets.[u] Roughly equivalent to F-104.
Mirage V	Ground attack aircraft derived from Mirage III. Same basic plane with improved fuel capacity and greater ordnance load. Maximum ordnance load in excess of 8000 lbs. including bombs, rockets and air-to-surface missiles.[v]

a. Jane's Aircraft 1955-56, p. 297.

b. Jane's Aircraft 1965-66, p. 279

c. Ibid., p. 266.

d. Personal interview with senior grade U.S. naval aviator who wished to remain anonymous, September 22, 1976.

e. Jane's Aircraft 1975-76, p. 349.

f. Ibid., pp. 387-388.

g. Ibid., pp. 341-343.

h. Ibid., pp.396-397.

i. Ibid., pp. 332-333.

j. Jane's Aircraft 1962-63, p. 296.

k. Ibid.

l. Jane's Aircraft 1965-66, pp. 328-329.

m. Jane's Aircraft 1975-76, pp. 511-512.

n. Ibid., p. 508.

o. Ibid., pp. 499-500.

p. Ibid., pp. 514-515.

q. Ibid., pp. 500-501.

r. Jane's Aircraft 1965-66, p. 131.

s. Jane's Aircraft 1964-65, pp. 152-153.

t. Jane's Aircraft 1965-66, pp. 133-134.

u. Ibid., p. 39.

v. Jane's Aircraft 1975-76, p. 58.

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
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